THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

We publish this month a short appreciation of the Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order from the pen of the Dean of Salisbury, who was one of the Anglican representatives: the claims which he makes for it are modest, but none the less solid for that. The session itself was eloquent of the growing understanding throughout Christendom of our Lord's will that His Church should be one, and of a new sensitiveness of conscience to the sin of schism. The last few weeks have witnessed a number of other gatherings also which have elicited widespread interest. The Presidential Address at the meeting of the British Association elicited some racy letters in *The Times* from Professor Relton. Perhaps a sufficient answer to Sir Arthur Keith's strange statement that the differences of mentality between apes and men are not of kind but only of degree may be found in a chance remark of Napoleon's. "Human beings," he said, "are controlled through their imaginations; that is what distinguishes them from animals." But, of course, many other criteria would point the same moral.

In the political sphere, Lord Cecil's resignation from the Cabinet on the Disarmament issue was a matter of widespread regret. Speeches at the recent session of the Assembly of the League of Nations elicited a pithy letter to *The Times* from Lord Phillimore, who was not satisfied that our attitude towards League ideals was all that it might be. Perhaps the election of Canada to a place on the Council will provide a new example of calling in the new world to redress the balance of the old. Nearer home, the meeting of the Trades Union Congress evoked both the courage and the wisdom of the Trades Union movement in full measure, and betrayed the constructive and co-operative spirit characteristic of our people.

REASON AND CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

I.—Apologetics Rational and Empirical

Two opposite methods of proof are open to the critic in order to establish the occurrence of some event which an ancient chronicler or tradition alleges. On the one hand, he may seek to show that if we suppose that the event happened, many data other than the old belief in the event are better explained or rendered more coherent. On the other hand, he may show that the very belief in the event is a fact in itself so singular, so inexplicable, so incoherent with all other data, that to suppose that the event occurred is the only way of making intelligible the fact that it was believed in. An obvious instance of this double possibility will spring to the minds of those who have studied historical discussions about the Gospels. We may seek to establish the fact of our Lord's resurrection, either by showing how necessary is the fact to explain the power of Christianity in the world, or else by showing how inexplicable otherwise would be the assured and joyful conviction in the Apostles' minds that the Lord had risen indeed. The instance makes it clear that the two arguments, though in a sense opposite, may also be complementary to each other.*

In the same way we may argue to the truth of religion either by showing how well religious beliefs, if true, can explain the general data of human experience and thought, or else by showing how altogether inexplicably strange is the existence of those beliefs themselves, if we regard them as delusions.

There are, then, two main methods of commending religious truth to the human mind. The first relies upon the argument from the explanatoriness of religious faith; the second upon the argument from the inexplicability of religious fact.

The first is the method of what is usually called rational apologetic. It has had a great history from the days of Plato onwards. Plato himself found in the Idea of the Good the explanation of all things; and that Idea really takes the place of Deity in the Platonic system. Aristotle more explicitly

* Other instances may be quoted where the two kinds of argument exclude each other. Thus Irenæus argues that there must be four authoritative Gospels, and only four, because there are four winds, four points of the compass, etc. A modern critic, on the other hand, takes Irenæus' argument as proving that there were four authoritative Gospels, because the argument is in itself so absurd, that, if there had not been four, Irenæus would never have thought of it. Similarly, it is suggested in the New Testament that the Scriptures show that certain events in our Lord's life must have taken place. The modern critic is often inclined to argue that the events did take place, because otherwise it is so difficult to understand the trouble taken in adducing far-fetched quotations from the Old Testament to account for them.

found belief in God necessary to any ultimate explanation of the world. And the three great proofs of God's existence which belong to the natural theology of the Catholic Church are similarly directed to show that to reject belief in God is to make nonsense of the facts of ordinary human experience. This is at any rate true of the cosmological and teleological proofs. The ontological proof stands somewhat apart from the other two, inasmuch as it bases itself on one special fact only, viz., the existence of the idea of perfection in the human mind. In some of its forms, therefore, it may be thought rather to approximate to the second type of apologetic.

Kant believed himself to have disposed once for all by logical criticism of the three traditional proofs of natural theology. Nevertheless his influence, combined with that of other moral philosophers, notably Bishop Butler, has been responsible for giving great authority to another kind of argument which is equally based on the explanatoriness of religious faith. According to it, God's existence is a necessary postulate of the moral consciousness, or, to state the point rather differently, belief in God is necessarily required in order to explain and justify rationally the moral experience of man. In England this argument has recently found distinguished exponents in the persons of Professor Sorley, the late Dr. Rashdall, and others.

But the general change effected by Kant was to shift the emphasis from belief in God as necessary to explain outward facts to belief in God as necessary to explain human valuations or ideals of goodness. No doubt it is the moral valuation and ideal which has seemed to require belief in God with most directness and cogency. But the argument that man's ideas of absolute value point to a divine Being as their source need not by any means restrict its appeal to ethics. In the philosophy of modern idealism it has been extended over the whole range of the values called absolute. And it is only necessary to mention such names as those of Professor Pringle-Pattison, Professor Webb, the Dean of St. Paul's, and the Bishop of Manchester to remind us what force has been given to the reasoning that man's ideals of truth and beauty must have some ground and source in a divine Being. It has even been found possible to frame a general argument that explanation itself can only be intelligibly given in terms of the fulfilment of some purpose conceived as good; and that consequently the world, if it can be rationally explained at all, must be explained as designed to fulfil some good purpose, which is presumably that of God. Thus the ontological and teleological proofs have been combined and restated in a new form. And some of the most recent essays

in rational apologetic have returned most nearly to its source in Plato.

Credo ut intelligam has been the motto of this apologetic down the ages, if we may supply *mundum* rather than *fidem* as the object of *intelligam*. From first to last its effort has been in many different ways to show that religious faith is necessary in order to explain the world we live in and the general experience of the normal man.

But in the long history of religious thought the motto *credo ut intelligam* has ever been confronted by its apparent opposite, *credo quia absurdum*. And the latter represents an attitude of mind which is by no means so entirely irrational and ridiculous as this paradoxical expression of it would imply. There are always facts in human experience which impress the mind, just because they appear to be abnormal, inexplicable, and consequently to demand an explanation confined to themselves. The greater their difference from other facts, the more cogently they point to an explanation which is to be believed as true precisely because it is confined to these particular facts, and is not applicable elsewhere. Now if there are facts in the world which differ from all others in bearing evidently upon them the tokens of a divine activity, we may base an apologetic on the ground that belief in God is necessary to account for these facts alone, and the belief, in so far as it is invoked to explain these facts, will be strengthened rather than weakened if it fails to explain others. This is the apologetic argument from the inexplicability of the religious fact. For the sake of brevity we will call it the *empirical* apologetic, as distinct from the *rational*, which we identified with the argument from the explanatoriness of religious faith. It must, of course, be remembered that we are using the terms empirical and rational in specialized senses.

Now it is evident that no monotheistic religion can rely on the empirical apologetic alone. If it did, it would confine the action of God to one part only of human experience; and this would be fatal to monotheism. Monotheistic theologians have however usually, though not invariably, held that certain classes of facts are self-evidently such as to require for their explanation a special activity of God, different from those general divine operations which are to be inferred either from the constitution of nature as a whole or from the constitution of human nature in so far as it is not immediately and specifically religious. They have thus supported the rational argument drawn from the explanatoriness of religious faith by an empirical argument embodying the contention that certain religious facts are inexplicable except as the manifest effect of a special activity of God.

One primitive form of the empirical apologetic is that which is based on *miracle*. A miracle, in its theological sense, may be defined as an abnormal event which in its abnormality is marked as a special act of God. But whatever differences of belief about miracles there may be in the modern world, it is now generally agreed that their strictly apologetic value has been reduced almost to vanishing-point. For it is evident that the answer to the question whether the abnormality of an event does or does not mark it as a special act of God depends upon the mind's antecedent belief about God's nature and existence. The notion that bare abnormality is in itself a sign of divine agency is no longer seriously maintained. Even St. Paul could only regard the merely abnormal miracle as an *argumentum ad hominem*, as when he said that speaking with tongues was a sign to the unbeliever. The unbelievers of his day associated the abnormal as such with the divine. The modern sceptic does not.

A much more important starting-point for empirical apologetic is found in the notion of *revelation*, especially in the more definite form which has been given to it by the traditional theology of the Christian Church. Catholic theologians have in effect set an empirical apologetic for Christianity, based on the facts of revelation, alongside of a rational apologetic for theism, based on the general constitution of the world. In their view the truths of theism, the doctrines of God, freedom, and immortality, are to be accepted because they are necessary to explain—that is, to render coherent and intelligible—the nature of the physical world and of man himself. The truths of the Christian revelation, on the other hand, the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Church, are to be accepted because they are themselves inexplicable as facts, except on the ground that they are truths specially disclosed by God through Jesus Christ. This, of course, is not itself a traditional statement of the traditional argument. But it seems not unfairly to represent the main purport and meaning of the old contention, that whereas the truths of natural theology can be proved by reason, the truths of the Christian revelation could never have been reached by reason, and are the substance of a special disclosure made by God.

Orthodox theologians have, of course, always added the qualification that the truths of revelation are not contrary to reason, though undemonstrable by it. And this saving clause opens up possibilities of defending specifically Christian truths by showing that these also are needed, if we would really make intelligible the whole world of human experience. Thus, the difference of principle between the apologetic for theism and

the apologetic for Christianity would tend to disappear. But traditional Catholic theology has never consented to this assimilation. It has clung to the affirmation that theism is demonstrable apart from Christianity; and, partly for that reason, it has never been able to proceed far with such a rational apologetic for Christian truths as would show that these also are needed to explain the world. In its view the truths of Christianity rest on the uniqueness and abnormality of the Christian facts, which it has jealously guarded. One far-reaching result of this attitude has been that the exposition of the Incarnation and the Atonement as general principles of metaphysic has been mainly left in the hands of definitely unorthodox philosophers, who in reaction against Catholicism have belittled altogether the necessary association of these truths with the particular historical facts of the life of Christ.

We have, however, still not mentioned the most obvious basis of all for a strictly empirical apologetic, viz., those inner *experiences* in which the human soul reaches out after and claims to apprehend the presence of God. Among specially religious souls such experiences have always furnished the main ground for belief. But only in quite modern times has this type of empirical apologetic come to be generally recognized as the most forcible plea which religion can urge in its behalf. Its modern prominence is largely due to the widespread distrust of metaphysics, the tendency to turn from them to science, especially the new science of psychology, and to the often expressed preference for resting beliefs on facts rather than theories, on experience rather than logic.

One man and one book, James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, gave the original impulse which turned in this direction the religious thinking of the modern world. James, though he was not himself endowed with special gifts of a religious order, possessed a magnificent candour of intellect as well as amazing powers of psychological analysis. He clearly perceived that the cognition of spiritual realities claimed by religion had as much right to be considered valid as other cognitive experiences of the human mind. His essential argument for the truth of religion rested on the plea that religion was itself a special kind or department of cognitive experience which could put in as good a claim as any other to establish the reality of its own special object. He rightly maintained that this argument issued from a philosophy of radical empiricism. For whereas the apologetic of rationalism was engaged in claiming that religious truths were required in order to account for the general, and not specifically religious, experience of the human mind, James based his apologetic upon the existence of

the specifically religious experience itself, which, as he argued with characteristic vigour, could not legitimately be explained away in terms of any other.

We have already maintained that no monotheism can stand upon such an empirical argument alone; for, if religion rests its whole case upon the uniqueness of a special class of facts or experiences, then whatever man knows of God is confined to this special class alone, and it becomes impossible to view the whole world as proceeding from or fulfilling a single divine purpose which is operative in all. But James did rest his religious apologetic upon the empirical argument alone. He was not interested in the power of the religious experience to reveal the inner meaning and coherent order of all things. Such a line of thought would have led back once more to the rationalism which he rejected. What really impressed James, and what he tried to impress upon others, was the relative abnormality, singularity, uniqueness of the religious experience itself; indeed, it has often been pointed out that it was the most apparently abnormal forms of the religious experience which impressed him most. And it is most instructive to note that, in the absence of any cogent religious experience of his own, he came to the provisional conclusion that the facts pointed to the existence of a plurality of finite gods. This would seem to be the natural result of a theology which is concerned to account for the specifically religious experience alone, without ever seeking to view the whole world in a religious light.

James has had a host of followers who have developed his argument, placed it on a broader basis, and removed it from a connection, which was really only accidental, with James's pragmatism in philosophy. In result there is a clear antithesis in modern apologetics between the rational school, which we mentioned earlier, and the empirical. The modern empiricists base the truth of religion upon the peculiar content of the religious experience itself. And it is becoming increasingly clear that disputations for and against the validity of religious faith can be conducted either on a rational or on an empirical platform. Where the platform is rational, the question in dispute is whether religious faith or else some non-religious philosophy or science can claim to give the most reasonable interpretation of the world as a whole. Where the platform is empirical, the question in dispute is whether the religious experience can be intelligibly accounted for as arising from non-religious causes, or is so peculiar and unique as to be inexplicable altogether, unless the account which it gives of itself is substantially true.

The most important essay in empirical apologetics which

has appeared in recent years is Otto's *Idea of the Holy*. And the sum of Otto's contention is precisely this, that religious ideas and valuations have been from the beginning of a quite distinct and specific kind, and cannot have been generated out of any other kind of experience which was not itself already religious in germ. Religion, he maintains, can never be fully rationalized; and a close inspection of his work reveals his essential meaning to be that religious ideas and valuations can never be fully interpreted or explained in terms of ideas and valuations other than religious. For example, to subsume the religious experience under the ethical is, in Otto's way of speaking, to rationalize it, however non-rational, in the ordinary sense of the term, our theory of ethics may be.

Thus the religious empiricist of today treats the religious experience in somewhat the same way as the Catholic theologian has been wont to treat the truths of revelation. To him it is beyond reason, though not contrary to reason. And the affirmation really means that, though doubtless the religious experience and its truth must ultimately be acknowledged as fitting with others into the coherent scheme of the whole world-order, yet they could not have been arrived at from any starting-point in reality other than themselves, and their present claim to recognition mainly rests upon the peculiarities of their specific nature. *Credo quia absurdum* expresses the argument in an extreme and exaggerated paradox.

We will defer to the next article the attempt to bring together the two apologetic methods. We may, however, conveniently conclude our present discussion by noting their different and characteristic consequences as they affect practical religion.

Rational apologetic emphasizes the connection of religion with the rest of life. It tends to break down the distinction between sacred and secular, and to find a religious meaning everywhere. But for that very reason it is apt to underrate the peculiar meaning and value of that which is specifically religious. Religion, in its thinking, furnishes a sanction and ground to moral and other values; but the specifically religious value of holiness is apt to lose its distinct character. This result is almost bound to follow, if, as Mr. Leonard Hodgson has so persuasively argued, the religious experience itself is to be treated not as a special experience with a special object, but rather as the whole experience of a religious man.* This means that it fails to satisfy the devotional instincts, especially those of the mystic who feels himself at certain moments of his life to have been veritably apprehended by God.

* *The Place of Reason in Christian Apologetic*, pp. 73-78.

Again, when rational apologetic handles the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement, it is apt to lose sight of the specific and unique character of the historical life which they interpret. Sometimes, as with the Hegelians and neo-idealists, the doctrines seem to be parted from their historical foundation, in order to become great spiritual principles which illuminate the whole history and experience of the human race. Sometimes, when the concern of the apologist is more predominantly ethical, the life of the Incarnate Himself becomes merely the embodiment of a moral ideal, and His Atonement no more than a supreme example of moral perfection. And in both cases Christian devotion cries out that its Lord has been taken away. Students of the works of such writers as Professor Pringle-Pattison and Dr. Rashdall will be aware of some of the limitations as well as of the strength of rational apologetic in the hands of characteristically modern and capable exponents.

Empirical apologetic, on the other hand, offers a much fuller satisfaction to the devotional consciousness. Everywhere it emphasizes the distinct character and value of the specifically religious fact. It makes much of the difference between sacred and secular, holy and common, though it does not always understand the difference in the same way. It encourages the soul to believe that uniquely at certain times and on certain occasions—the sacraments, the meditation, or the inward experience of conversion—it can achieve that reality of communion with God which is all that ultimately matters either in religion or in life. And when the empirical apologist is speaking of the Person of Christ, it will be on its heavenly and mysterious uniqueness, rather than on its fulfilment of a human ideal, that he will be concerned to dwell. He is often loud in protest against any tendency to confuse religion either with ethics or with idealist philosophy; and occasionally he points to the way of asceticism and renunciation as the royal road to heaven upon earth.

But empiricism also has its practical dangers and limitations. It is apt to worship the God of a particular experience only, and to forget that the God who made the sacred made the secular also, rejoices in all that He has made, and through all can receive man into communion with Himself. Forgetting this, it may try to force the religion of all men into a mould which is only fitted for those of specially religious temperament and inclinations—and these are not at all to be identified with those to whom moral goodness is natural, but rather with those in whom certain kinds of emotion, impulse, and imagination are particularly strong.

There is, indeed, the gravest practical danger in supposing, as religious empiricists are too often inclined to do, that the

test of religious value can be found within religion itself. How often do we hear devout Christians, both priests and lay-people, speaking as though they took it for granted that any religious belief or practice which draws people to church and sacraments, stimulates the expression of devotional feelings, or gives a sense of what Otto calls the numinous, has by that very fact proved its truth or worth beyond dispute. And when the moral and social conduct of those who are most earnest in religious observance leaves something rather conspicuously to be desired, we sometimes hear it suggested by those who should know better that the religious zeal may be reckoned as doing something to outweigh the moral failures. There is a school of Christian piety which comes perilously near to insinuating that a prolonged and fervent crying of "Lord, Lord" will atone for the absence of any equally prolonged and fervent effort to do what the Lord said. Religious empiricism is always apt to forget that, the more distinct religion is from ethics, the greater the need to test religious values by their ethical results.

These reflections lead me to a final observation upon a somewhat paradoxical state of affairs which has recently arisen in the Church of England. The most widespread and vigorous movement in the body of modern Anglicanism is undoubtedly the Anglo-Catholic. And, so far as liturgical matters are concerned, its course has been marked by an ever-increasing trend towards the practice of Rome. There are many Anglo-Catholics today who commend almost without reserve the entire Roman system of devotion both public and private. But, just because the main interest of the movement is conspicuously devotional rather than intellectual or doctrinal, the apologists who best represent its mind always incline to empirical rather than to rational arguments. For the rationalism of Catholic natural theology they have very little regard. And it was most interesting to observe that while Roman Catholic critics condemned Otto's *Idea of the Holy* out of hand, Anglicans gave it a most cordial welcome. The non-Roman, because non-rational, character of Anglo-Catholic theology is still more conspicuously shown in the recent volume entitled *Essays Catholic and Critical*. Here we find leaders of Anglo-Catholic thought relying in the main on empirical arguments, which they combine with a frank acceptance of the principles of historical criticism. And in the result they depart completely from the whole argumentative method of the older Catholicism. In part of Professor Taylor's essay alone is the rational standpoint clearly taken; and even he lays relatively more weight on the argument from experience than might have been expected.

It would seem, therefore, that, while modern thought has successfully vindicated the real and distinct importance of the empirical apologetic as a means of establishing religious truth, we are in danger of undervaluing the older methods of argument which empiricism has displaced.

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ISRAEL AND EDOM: THE ORACLE OF OBADIAH—II.

NOTHING is known of Ob. except what we can learn from his book. The name is so common that it is no use to try (as Jerome and Pusey tried) to identify him with any O.T. person of the same name. It is clear that he was a native of Judah, and, for reasons which will be explained later, I am of opinion that he was a contemporary and an eye-witness of the great catastrophe of the capture and sack of Jerusalem by the Chaldees in 586.

I divide the book into three parts, verses 1-9, 10-18, 19-21.

The first division, 1-9, has obvious relations with some verses in Jer. xlix., occurring in an oracle against Edom, although the words of the two recensions show not inconsiderable differences—also with a passage in Jer. xxxviii.

Thus Ob. 1 =Jer. xlix. 14.
„ 2 = „ xlix. 15.
„ 3 and 4= „ xlix. 16.
„ 5 = „ xlix. 9.
„ 6 has a slight resemblance to xlix. 10.
„ 7 has a slight resemblance to Jer. xxxviii. 22.
„ 8 has some resemblance to Jer. xlix. 7.
„ 9 shows no resemblance.

It is generally agreed that the piece in Ob. has more the appearance of an original than the fragments dispersed in Jeremiah.* The verses in Ob. form a connected oracle with a sequence and an inner connection, while in Jer. they are scattered about among other matter. Ob. begins at the beginning: "I have heard a report," while Jer. has this phrase in the middle. Jer. fuses Ob.'s verses 3 and 4 into one verse xlix. 16, and therefore the phrase "from there" has, in his text, no meaning. The important verses 7 and 9 are not represented in Jer. xlix.

* See Caspari, *Obadiah*, p. 6 *f.*; Driver, *Int.*, i., 298; Marti, *Dodekapropheton*, p. 230; Hoonacker, *Les douze petits prophètes*, p. 290.

at all. In many of the slighter parallels, Jer. gives the impression of a writer quoting by memory from some known original. On the other hand, the passage in Jer. xlix. 15 is considered to be more original and has a better text than Ob. 2., and similarly Jer. xlix. 9 seems* more original than Ob. 5. It was, in view of these phenomena, very natural for the earlier interpreters† who regarded Ob. as belonging to a period long before the fall of Jerusalem, to think that Jer. reset the words of Ob. in his own prophecy.

But in view of the complicated facts and of the acknowledged difficulty of determining originality and of fixing priority as between contemporary writers, I cannot feel that either prophet borrowed these verses from the other. The true solution seems to me to be that (as in Isa. ii. 2-4, Mic. iv. 1-5, Isa. xv.-xvi. 12) both prophets took these verses from the extant oracle of an older prophet.‡ I think this is implied in the opening words: "Thus hath the Lord Jahveh spoken about Edom." To recover this old oracle as far as possible, the passage Ob. 1-9 must be taken as a basis, corrected where necessary by the LXX and by Jer., and certain ejaculatory remarks intercalated by Ob. or perhaps by an editor must be noted. The result will be somewhat as follows:

1. I have heard a report from Jahveh,
   And a messenger has been sent among the nations.
   Up, and let us rise up against her in war.
2. See, I make thee small among the nations:
   Thou art despised by all men.
3. The pride of thy soul has deceived thee,
   O dweller in the clefts of the rock,
   Making his habitation on high;
   Saying in his heart,
   Who will bring me down to earth ?
4. If thou shouldest soar aloft like the eagle
   And set thy nest among the stars
   From thence I will bring thee down, saith Jahveh.
5. If thieves came to thee by night,
   (Ejac.: How thou art destroyed !)
   Would they not steal (only) what they wanted ?
   If grape gatherers came to thee,
   Would they not leave gleanings ?
6. How is Esau searched through,
   His treasure chambers explored !

* Nowack, *Die Kl. propheten*, ed. iii., 175.

† Caspari, u.s., Pusey, *Minor Proph.*, iii. 228. See König, *Einleit*, p. 361.

‡ Ewald, *Proph.*, E.T., ii., 278; Driver, u.s., Kuenen, *Einleit*, ii., 351-354. See Cornill, *Einleit*, p. 194, Sellin, *Zwölfprophetenbuch*, p. 229.

7. To the boundary they drove thee;
   All thine allies betrayed thee;
   Those who were at peace with thee destroyed thee;
   (Those who ate) thy bread laid snares for thee.
   (Ejac.: He has no understanding !)
8. Is it not in that day, saith Jahveh,
   That I destroy wise men from Edom
   And understanding from Esau's mountains ?
9. And thy heroes tremble, Teman,
   So that every man may be cut off from Esau's mountain.

Critical Notes.

Ver. 1. M.T. שָׁמַעְנוּ; so Lat., Syr., Targ. But LXX and Jer. שָׁמַעְתִּי, which is better. *The prophet has heard*, as Zeph. ii. 7.

Ver. 2. M.T. מְאֹד; so LXX *σφόδρα*; Lat. *valde*. But Jer. בָּאָדָם which is much stronger, and is generally adopted.

Ver. 3. M.T. מְרוֹם; LXX *ὑψῶν* = מְרִים, which is much better. So Nowack, Marti.

Ver. 4. M.T. שִׂים. Gr., Lat., Syr. all read תָּשִׂים, which is obviously right. So Wellhausen, Marti.

Ver. 5. M.T. אִם־שׁוֹדְדִי לַיְלָה. These words are omitted by Jer. and, it seems, rightly (Robinson), except לַיְלָה, which adds a vivid trait to the description. This word is Accus. of time-determination (Ges. K., 118., i-l).

Ver. 7. M.T. לַחְמֶךָ. This word is not read by LXX, and Nowack, Wellh., Marti suggest that it got into the text by dittography. But it might be left out by homoioteleuton. It is read by Lat., Syr., AΣΘ. Sym. gives the clue *οἱ συνεσθίοντες σοι*. Lat. *qui comedunt tecum*. Robinson suggests the insertion of אִכְלִי (Ps. xli. 10), or perhaps we might supply this word in thought. I have so translated it.

Ver. 8. M.T. מִזּוּר is not easy to understand. The LXX, Lat, and Syr. all translate "plots" or "snares," and as I can find nothing better, I have followed them. See Nowack *ad loc.*

Ver. 9. תֵּקָּחֵל belongs not to this verse but to the beginning of ver. 10.

Ewald and Sellin include ver. 10 in the old oracle, but I think this is erroneous. There is a break here in the topic. This old oracle has no mention of any hostilities or hostile feeling between *Israel* and Edom, but relates entirely to some stroke already inflicted on Edom by "the nations" who had previously been her "covenant men" or allies. These persons had

apparently made a serious raid into Edom, occupied Seir-Petra, and thoroughly sacked it and driven the inhabitants to the extremities of their territory. The author makes the reflection that it was no evidence of the wisdom of the Edomites that they had suffered themselves to be so deceived by their false confederates. These faithless allies would seem* to have been the little clans of nomad Arabs who surrounded Edom's territory, and it is evident that they thoroughly robbed the country while they were there. It is vain to seek for an exact historic setting for this event. Ewald† referred it to the time when Resin King of Aram restored Elath to Edom, and drove the Jews out of Elath in the time of Ahaz (2 Kings xvi. 6), but the words of the oracle do not seem suitable to this explanation. Sellin connects it with the time when Edom obtained her independence under Jehoram (2 Kings viii. 20), but there is nothing in the oracle pointing to this event. But Sellin may well be on the right track when he dates this piece about 800,‡ and considers it to be the oldest written prophecy extant, remarking that it has some of the characteristics of Isa. xv.-xvi. 12. This raid may then be regarded as the beginning of a series of similar attacks by these Arabian tribes with the constant design of conquering the southern part of the country and the trade routes, in which, as we shall see later, they at last succeeded.

In ver. 10-18 we are in a very different atmosphere. The topic has changed, it is not now a blow inflicted upon Edom long years ago; it is the recent malignity of Edom to Judah. We are now watching the terrible scenes of the sack of Jerusalem, and it is my belief that we are watching them through the eyes of a man who actually saw them. It does not meet the case to say, "The writer transfers himself into the past in lively fashion."§ None but an eye-witness could mingle such vivid details of horror with such outpourings of an agonized soul. This man has seen the cruel outrages he describes,‖ and felt them with the glowing pain of a patriotic heart. And his grief is a recent experience, not a memory of distant years and sorrows long ago. These horrid scenes are still before his eyes; he still feels the distress of them as a present sorrow. The view of Sellin,¶ that this piece was written in 500, while the wound was still bleeding (eighty-six years after), is not satisfactory or adequate. It does not do justice to the text. If these verses had been written so long after the event, time would have blurred the sharp outlines

* Wellhausen, *Skizzen*, v., 213; Nowack, u.s., p. 177.
† *Gesch.*, E.T., iv., 159.
‡ "The archetype of both must have been very ancient" (Robinson, *J.T.S.*, July, 1916, p. 404).
§ Nowack, u.s., p. 178. ‖ Wellhausen, *Skizzen*, v., 212.
¶ *Op. cit.*, p. 227. So Hoonacker, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

of the facts and softened the violence of the grief. So let us try to realize what Obadiah saw. After recalling with satisfaction the venerable oracle of Edom's old-time disaster, and predicting for her an even worse fate, he proceeds to denoun her conduct on the fateful day.

10. It is because of murder, of violence done to thy brother Jacob, that shame shall cover thee, and thou shalt be cut off for ever.

11. On the day when thou didst stand opposite, on the day when foreigners captured his army and aliens entered his gates (Kri) and cast lots over Jerusalem, *Thou* too wast like one of them.

He recalls how he had seen the Edomites lurking around the captured city, entering it with the foreign army, and joining these aliens in their work of murder and spoliation. As he remembers these horrors, he can no longer write calmly, but he apostrophizes these savages as if they were present, suddenly bursting into an elegy or *Kinah*-poem with a recurring burden, so charged with grief and indignation that I for one cannot read it without sharing the writer's emotion:

12. Oh, do not feast thine eyes on the day of thy brother,
In the day of his misfortune.
And do not rejoice over Judah's sons
In the day of their ruin.
And do not open thy mouth wide
In the day of oppression.
13. Do not enter the gates of my people
In the day of their calamity.
Do not feast thine eyes, thou too, on his misery
In the day of his calamity.
And do not stretch out a hand after his wealth
In the day of his calamity.
14. And do not stand at the cross-road
To cut off his escaped ones.
And do not deliver up his fugitives
In the day of oppression.

Critical Notes.

Ver. 12. נָכְרוֹ. This seems to be the same thing as נָבָר, Job xxxi. 3, where it is parallel to אֵיד. LXX, *ἀλλοτρίων*, and Syr. read נָכְרִים, which does not give a bad sense; but M.T. is more suited to the style of the poem.

Ver. 13. M.T. תִּשְׁלַחְנָה is impossible. Read with Targ. יָדְךָ תִּשְׁלַח. See Ges.-K., 47 *k*.

Ezek. xxxv. 6. בְּעֵת אֵידָם seems to be a reminiscence of this verse.

It is characteristic of many prophets, at a moment of overpowering emotion, to insert in their writings a dirge or *Kinah*-poem written in the appropriate metre—a lyric treatment of some national sorrow or impending disaster. Examples are: Amos v. 2, Jer. ix. 9, 20, 21; Ezek. xix., xxvi. 17; Isa. xiv. 4-21. So here Ob. at the very height of his emotion naturally adopts a lyric strain.

To his picture of the Edomites gazing at, rejoicing in, and boasting over Judah's ruin, of their plundering his wealth, and murdering and enslaving his fugitives, some traits may be added from other sources. Edom is acting in a spirit of revenge (Ezek. xxv. 12). "There was with thee a perennial enmity, and thou didst deliver up Israel's sons to the edge of the sword at the time of their calamity, at the time when iniquity had its full course" (Ezek. xxxv. 5). "You opened your mouth wide against me and multiplied your words against me" (*Ibid.* 13). "Thy punishment is decreed, daughter of Edom" (Lam. iv. 22). "The sons of Edom in the day of Jerusalem were saying, Lay bare, Lay bare, down to her very foundation" (Ps. cxxxvii. 7). Indeed, there is a late tradition that the Edomites actually burnt the Temple (1 Esdr. iv. 45). These traits fill up and confirm Obadiah's picture of the iniquity of these bitter enemies on that fatal day.

Hölscher* suggests that these lyrical outbursts are gross exaggerations, on the sole ground that it is stated (Jer. xl. 11) that some fugitive Jews had taken refuge in Edom, a fact which is implied in Ob. 14. Those who could escape from the Chaldeans would naturally flee in all directions, even if this involved crossing the Edomite border. This does not in any way invalidate the evidence that I have quoted as to the behaviour of those Edomites who were in or about captured Jerusalem. I regard this behaviour as being as fully proved as any event in ancient history. And no other view would have been put forward but for a desire to prove that the kindly feelings expressed in Deut. towards Edom were compatible with a post-exilic dating of that book.

At this point a new and comforting thought occurred to the prophet. *The day of Jahveh* was a conception familiar to the Hebrew people from an early date. Amos (v. 18) speaks of it as a future event commonly expected by the people he was addressing. The prince-prophet Zephaniah (iii. 8) in the reign of Josiah had given a new significance to the popular conception by declaring that the day of Jahveh would be a day of universal judgment, not only on Judah (i. 2-13) but on nations, kingdoms, the whole earth.† Ob. must have heard of this recent pronounce-

* Art. cit., p. 212, n. 5.

† See my art., "The Day of the Lord in Joel," *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1926, pp. 52-53.

ment, and the matter presented itself to him in this way: "If there be judgment on all nations it will include Edom." So he goes on:

15. For near is the day of Jahveh on all nations. As thou (Edom) hast done it shall be done to thee; thy reward shall come back on thy head.

16. For as you (Judah*) have drunk on my holy mountain, all nations shall drink wine:† they shall drink and gulp and be as if they were not.

17. And in Mount Sion shall be a delivered people, and they shall be holy, and the house of Jacob shall resume their possessions.

18. And the house of Jacob shall be fire and the house of Joseph flame and the house of Esau stubble, and they shall dart upon them and consume them, and there shall not be a fugitive of the house of Esau, *for Jahveh hath said it.*

Several of the ideas expressed in these verses are also to be found in other writings of about the same period, being obviously current in prophetic circles. The thought of the day of Jahveh, a universal judgment on all nations, had been fully drawn out by Jeremiah in the fourth year of Jehoiakim (Jer. xxv. 18-23). Later Ezekiel applies this thought to the destruction of Gog and his northern hordes (Ezek. xxx. 3, xxxviii. 9, 10). The striking metaphor of the cup of wrath presented to all nations which they must drink, however unwillingly, is elaborated by Jeremiah in the same oracle (xxv. 15; see Lam. iv. 21) from whence, perhaps, Ob. derived it together with the accompanying thought that Jerusalem must also taste the fatal draught. The view that Joseph, the northern tribes, would one day be again united with Judah, which had been long before expressed by Hosea (iii. 4, 5), was vigorously developed by Jer. (xxxi. 18*f.*) and by Ezekiel (xxxvii. 18*f.*). All these ideas were, so to speak, in the air at this period. It is for this reason (among others) that I consider verses 15-18 to be part of Ob.'s work, and not an addition by a later hand. The view of Nowack and others that there is a break at ver. 15, all that follows being an eschatological appendix by some editor, does not seem to me well grounded. It is based on an *à priori* view that all passages relating to the judgment of Jahveh on the heathen are dependent on Ezekiel. With regard to Ob. this is simply not so. There is nothing here at all like the wild visions of Ezek. 38-39, nor does there appear to be in Ob. any dependence on Ezekiel at all. Obadiah's eschatology, slight as it is, is borrowed from

* Ewald, *op. cit.*, p. 285; Nowack, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

‡ M.T. תָּמִיד, LXX. οἶνον = חָמָר, which is better.

Zeph. and Jer. if it is borrowed at all. He shows but little interest in any *general* judgment on heathen nations. His topic is judgment on Edom, and these verses bear on that all-absorbing theme. If, then, the day of Jahveh was a conception handed down from earlier times, if the metaphor of the cup had been made current by a contemporary, if union with the northern tribes was an old aspiration, if we can trace the sources of Ob.'s eschatology and note in these verses the dominance of his prevailing thought, we shall see no reason to attribute these verses to a second author. And the expression "Jahveh has said it," forms a suitable conclusion to the book.

An entirely different view must, in my opinion, be taken of verses 19-21, which can hardly be held even by conservative critics* to belong to the same author as 10-18. These verses have the look of an expansion by a later hand of Ob.'s phrase that the house of Jacob should resume their possessions. He ideally beholds Edom and Philistia, Ephraim, Samaria, and Gilead as subject to the Jewish state, as in the best days of the monarchy, and there is to be a return of Judean captives from the ends of the earth, and a theocratic government of all.

The text of this passage is corrupt and confused, and its outlook is Utopian, not predictive. It is apocalypse, not prophecy, and is quite different in quality from the clear oracle of Ob., which, like all real prophecy, is securely founded on existing facts, and utters predictions on the basis of those facts. Ob. was concerned with the crimes and the punishment of Edom, and with nothing else. These vague and wide-sweeping dreams of territorial expansion are quite outside his line of thought. So I do not propose further to examine these verses or to weary my readers by discussing (for about the thousandth time) the geographical situation of *Sepharad*.

Not very long after the ruin of Jerusalem, Edom received a crushing blow in the conquest of Seir-Petra and the southern part of the country, including the Gulf of Akaba and the trade routes, by the Nabatean Arabs. The first clear historical attestation of this fact is found in the accounts of the expedition of Antigonus against Egypt in 311, when we find his generals engaged in hostilities with the Nabateans, both at Petra and around the Dead Sea.† But earlier traces of the event may be discovered. The bitter oracle of Malachi (i. 2-5) shows that Edom had then, *circa* 450, received this blow. It would appear that Petra was then a "desolation" inhabited by jackals, and that the hopes cherished by Edom of rebuilding their ruins

* See Orelli, *Die Zwolf. Kl. Proph.*, ed. iii., 96.
† Niese, *Gesch. v. Griesch. u. Makedon.*, Staaten, i., 300-302.

were obviously vain and delusive. Earlier still, Cambyses, on his journey to Egypt, found it necessary to make terms with "the King of the Arabians," which seems to mean the head sheikh of these Nabateans, in order to obtain safe conduct through the desert.* It seems probable that this event happened not very long after the fall of Jerusalem, and that the old oracle quoted by Ob. related to an earlier attempt of the same kind, which probably led to others more and more serious. Perhaps Gashmu the Arabian, who gave Nehemiah so much trouble (Neh. ii. 19, vi. 1-2), was also a Nabatean.†

At the same time as this Nabatean invasion,‡ and no doubt in consequence of it, the Edomites pressed over their northern boundary and took possession of part of the Negeb of Judah (Esdr. iv. 50), which was no doubt largely depopulated by the deportation of the inhabitants. The land they occupied was afterwards known as *Idumea* (Mark iii. 2).§ It certainly included Hebron, one day's journey from Jerusalem, and extended as far as Gaza, the old Philistine boundary.‖ The possession of these territories by Edom was almost bound to lead to disputes and hostilities when the Jews returned; and prophetic allusions make it clear that this was so. In Isa. xxxiv. the indignation of Jahveh is declared. His sword comes down upon Edom—there is a ban upon them. Jahveh has a sacrifice in Bosra, and a great slaughter in the land of Edom (vv. 5-7). The prophet gives an interesting sidelight on the internal condition of Edom at this period. "Her nobles—there is no kingdom there for them to proclaim—and all her princes are nothing" (ver. 12). Very impressive, too, of the state of feeling in Judah is the mystic vision of a lofty, wondrous figure marching in from Bosra with his glorious raiments stained with Edomite blood, one who had trodden the winepress alone on a day of vengeance, and poured out life-blood upon the earth (Isa. lxiii. 1-6).

A long period was to elapse before these fiery predictions were accomplished. At last, in 164, Judas the Maccabee fought against the children of Esau in the land towards the south, where he smote Hebron and her daughter villages, and pulled down the fortress of it, and burned the towers thereof round about (1 Macc. v. 65). Later, John Hyrcanus compelled the Idumeans to submit to circumcision, and they were incorporated into the Judean nation, but, as Josephus observes, an Idumean is only half a Jew.¶

* *Herod.*, iii., 4-5.
† See Cannon, *Sixty-Eighth Psalm*, p. 19.
‡ *Enc. Bib.*, art. "Nabateans" (W. R. Smith and F. K. Cheyne).
§ Josephus, *Bell.*, iv., 9, 7; 1 Macc. v. 65.
‖ Ewald, *Gesch.*, E.T., v., 81.
¶ Joseph., *Ant.*, xiv., 15, 2.

It was at this time that the son of Sirach expressed his hatred of three nations, one of which was the foolish people that dwelt at Gebal* (Ecclus. l. 26). It seems like an irony of fate that after these events Judah should have been subjugated and ruled by the crafty Idumeans, Antipater and Herod the Great. At the very last, the elder of the brothers exerted his strength and ruled over the younger. Then came the end, and the Idumean people disappeared from history in sanguinary conflicts waged by them in company with the Zealots against the Roman armies in the siege of Jerusalem.†

In that strange fragment "The Oracle of Dumah" (Isa. xxi. 11-12) the answer returned to him who called from Seir was this: "Morning comes, and night as well."

These words are an epitome of the history of Edom.‡ Periods of light are followed by periods of darkness. At dawn, a glimmer of hope—at night, catastrophe and despair. So, the last bright morning for Edom shone after a long period of gloom in the time of the Herods, and this too sank into the surrounding night, till *Edom* becomes *Dumah*—Silence-land, the long silence of extinction (Ps. cxv. 7).

W. W. CANNON.

THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF ST. IGNATIUS LOYOLA—II.

IV.—CONTENTS OF THE EXERCISES

IN a certain feeling of difficulty how best to adapt my treatment of the Exercises to my present audience, I have endeavoured to follow the responsible advice given me, to lean heavily to the historical side, without expounding at great length the logical and psychological aspect of the Exercises. Consequently this heading, which might so easily be expanded until I should almost be accused of attempting to give my hearers what might be called a potted retreat, I here present severely compressed.

The Exercises are divided into four weeks. The first is devoted to purgation, and consists in the main of meditations upon sin and hell. The second is a time of illumination, devoted mainly to the contemplation of the life of Christ, which finds its practical application in certain "key-meditations" (so to call them), and in the whole business of election. The third

* This is the Syriac reading (Charles, *Apocrypha*, i., 511). I think it the true text.

† Josephus, *Bell.*, iv., 9, 7; vii., 8, 1.

‡ See Delitszch, *Isaiah*, E.T., i., 353.

may be called an intensified form of the second, the work of which it clinches; it is the contemplation of the passion and death of Christ, pressing home the lessons of His life and teaching. The fourth week is devoted to union, to the thought of the risen life and of heaven, whither we ascend with Christ. The "weeks," as has been said already, are elastic; there is a work to be accomplished in them, and one must await its accomplishment. Still, the full exercises should be finished in about a month; such was the original idea of Ignatius, faithfully observed in his order. The individual's own spiritual condition should determine the emphasis upon the purgative, illuminative, or unitive periods. I now summarize the Exercises rather more fully.

Strictly speaking, "the principle or foundation" which opens them lies outside the weeks, and underlies them all. It is a simple and evident statement of man's relation and duty to His Creator, which no Christian can deny; it does not even mention love. In this way it finds ready acceptance, even at the outset, while at the same time it furnishes all the more powerful motive for shame and sorrow, by reason of sins committed against duty so plain. And yet the principle that "man is created to praise, reverence, and serve God our Lord, and by this means to save his soul," and that all else is created in order to help him thus to save his soul—this principle is pressed home as the only proper principle of man's free choice and desire. So far as possible he should remain "indifferent," that is, he should not determine himself to one alternative rather than another except in so far as this principle requires it, precisely and only because it requires it. Thus complete sanctity, utter union with the Divine Will, lies implicit in this principle, which it is the purpose and trend of the Exercises to make explicit and effective in perfect love.

The first week proper is a time of repentance and all that belongs thereto, with the thoughts of sin and hell for motive power. Although these are intended to lead to shame and sorrow and a holy fear, Ignatius nowhere leaves the exercitant overwhelmed with any such emotion, but always at the end brings him to the foot of the Cross, where he finds Divine Mercy awaiting him. In this way also the way is prepared to the second week.

This second week contains the life of Christ, taken in the main from the gospels, though from time to time there are evident reminiscences of Ludolph of Saxony's *Life of Christ* and of the Golden Legend. It is the time of illumination, when the exercitant is endeavouring to model his life upon the life and teaching of Christ; accordingly it is the most practical time

(in the strictest sense of the term) of the Exercises, and it is here that Ignatius inserts by far the greater part of what is peculiar to himself. The week opens with the parable of Christ the King; or rather, this may be called a new foundation for the rest of the Exercises, in reality preceding the opening of the second week. Christ invites all to serve beneath his banner; He is the great crusading king, like a St. Louis, or a very different and holier counterpart of the conquerors of Mexico and Peru. Christ the King bears all his followers' difficulties and privations; they in turn must seek to distinguish themselves by coveting, not glory, but the shame and suffering of the Cross. After some early meditations, Christ's true plan of campaign is pressed home by the meditation on the two standards, itself followed by a consideration of the three degrees of humility; Christ seeks to win men through poverty and dishonour to humility, Satan through riches and honour to pride.

After that begins the "Election," running concurrently with further meditations upon the life of Christ, which (Ignatius never doubts) will be seen to reinforce the view he is urging of the principles of Christ's life and teaching. Ignatius supposes that a great choice is to be made, normally no doubt in regard of the evangelical counsels, poverty, chastity, and obedience; though at the same time he is prepared to be content with mere amendment of life, if an irrevocable choice (as of religious life, or marriage) has already been made, or if the exercitant be not prepared to make a change. Ignatius is most elaborate in his efforts to secure a good and true election; it is to be made (apart from special and clear divine impulses) with calm deliberation, and an entire freedom from motives of flesh and blood, and from all other prejudice—in a word, it is to be as different as possible from all that we usually associate with an election. The fact that Ignatius has such an election primarily in view, and not a permanent rule of life, should always be borne in mind; the Exercises are intended chiefly for a time of crisis, not as a sort of *vade-mecum* for the pious. For a model of what the Exercises should be we might consider, for example, Ignatius giving them to a Francis Xavier. They are intended to be, and for a multitude they have been, the call upon the way to Damascus, the heavenly vision which it is their supreme hope and privilege to obey.

But the call may be hard! Yes, and Christ at the end walks the way to Calvary; the third week is His Passion and Death, teaching generous resolve to stand fast by what has been seen to be His will and following. Yet that is not the only way to strengthen resolves, seeing that we must always be making our own, not only the death, but the risen life of Christ; the exercitant

must turn his thoughts in the fourth week to the Resurrection, and dwell upon the joy and triumph which Christ gives largely here below and fulfils hereafter. From the contemplation of Christ in triumph he turns to God as He is in his essential and ever-present and infinite self, first of all as the source of all benefits to the exercitant in particular, and to mankind in general, and finally as He is simply in Himself. To love God as He is in Himself, and purely for that reason, without any thought of benefit derived from Him, is the most perfect act of man. The Exercises close with an utter and entire devotion of self to God in purest love.

Such are the essential lines upon which the Exercises run. There are a multitude of little notes, helping the exercitant in various matters, a number of rules imparting spiritual direction, and various other features upon which I cannot afford to linger.

V.—Main Characteristics of the Exercises

The Exercises have many striking characteristics, but in endeavouring to select a very few as more fundamental and as especially deserving of explanation and emphasis, I find three traits which it appears to be worth while to set forth explicitly before you. These are, their directness, their freedom, their adaptability.

Their directness: Ignatius is always quite clear what he wants, and goes straight for it. There is no beating about the bush. He recognized, as we shall see, that not all were ripe for advanced doctrine; but his solution was to leave things unsaid, not to water anything down. Except where there is lack of generosity, he gives no quarter; his well-known maxim was that the enemy should not merely be beaten, but smashed (Annot. 13). Even at the opening, as has been seen, his doctrine of "indifference" is very drastic. For conquering a fault, again, he would have the exercitant think of it in the morning, examine himself twice a day about it, see whether he is committing it less often, do penance when he catches himself falling; in short, we should expect the fault to disappear forthwith, did we not know that faults founded on character never really do quite disappear. But at least it should be a fairly harmless peccadillo after a prolonged bout of this tremendous hammering. Or if in the matter of "election" the exercitant still finds himself with some strong attachment, which threatens to prevent him from choosing purely with an eye to God's greater service, he is not merely to endeavour to abstract from such an attachment, but to react forcefully against it, protesting that he desires and

prays for what is contrary thereto, provided only that this be for the divine service and praise.

If I speak in the second place of the freedom of the Exercises, I am conscious that I have against me a common notion, which I cannot but regard as an ill-grounded prejudice, that Ignatius' method of prayer and direction leave very little room for freedom indeed. Here, as elsewhere, I must be brief; but the first consideration I would urge is, that it is a mistake to speak of Ignatius' "method of prayer" as though there were only one. In the Exercises he offers at least seven methods, and that, as Father Polancus observes (M.H., p. 828), without wishing to exclude others. It is probably because of his rather minute prescriptions for the beginning of an ordinary meditation that he has been thought rigid in his uniformity; but it may be observed that while he is rightly careful about the beginning and end of prayer, which it is so easy to scamp, yet the time during which a prescribed form is to be exactly followed only lasts but a few minutes, the rest of the hour being left to the free play of memory, understanding, and will. It is rightly supposed that it is natural in the main for the faculties to operate in this order, which was also traditional, but nothing is prescribed as to time or other details. Ignatius' one anxiety is that there should be no hurry to move on, that the exercitant should make the most of any consoling thought or affection. "For it is not the abundance of knowledge," he writes, "that fills and satisfies the soul, but to feel and relish things interiorly" (Annot. 2). Moreover, after each exercise a quarter of an hour is to be spent on considering how it has succeeded (Addit. 5); Ignatius supposes that something can be learnt from experience, even in what regards method. It is true that there is little that bears directly upon mystical contemplation. (I may observe that "contemplation" is not used by Ignatius in the mystical sense, but of considering things and events visible to the senses, "meditation" proper being a more intellectual process, though "meditation" itself is often used in a wide sense.) In the rules for the discernment of spirits, however, there is much that goes far to distinguish true and false mysticism. That Ignatius did not go farther in his treatment of mysticism may partly be due to the Inquisition, which was on the look-out for the false mysticism of the *Illuminati*. To suppose that Ignatius, a great mystic himself and with great mystics among his disciples, was quite unprepared to make allowance for mystical experiences would be ludicrous.

The chief proof of the freedom of the Exercises, however, is to be found in the treatment of the election; Ignatius aims at perfect dispositions, but will not dictate the conclusion.

On the contrary, he warns the director to "leave the Creator to act directly with the creature, and the creature with his Creator and Lord" (Annot. 15). Nothing could be further from Ignatius' mind than the picture sometimes drawn of an obedient victim, ready to enter upon any walk of life at the director's mere word; Ignatius' emphatic view is that such a word must come from God, and God alone, at all events during the Exercises. We are reminded of the Baptist's words: "He that hath the bride is the bridegroom; but the friend of the bridegroom, who standeth and heareth him, with joy rejoiceth because of the bridegroom's voice" (John iii. 29).

In the third place, I would call attention to the adaptability of the Exercises. This goes back in such large measure to Ignatius that we need not doubt that he would have approved of all. He is prepared to take what he can get. The "long retreat" of thirty days is made by all members of his order shortly after entry, and by priests once again before they are fully fledged; it is seldom made outside the order, except by some religious congregations. Would that more made it! Great fruit would doubtless follow. It is the putting on of a new life, quite different in effect from the short retreats now in vogue. Ignatius, however, would not take any through the whole of the Exercises who had not excellent dispositions. Of these dispositions account is always to be taken; the exercitant must be led on gently and sweetly to something better, without disheartening or repelling him. His opportunities must also be considered; Ignatius is prepared to adapt the Exercises to those who can spare only a little time daily for them. Collective retreats certainly go back to Ignatius' time; annual retreats do not. An annual retreat of eight days became the law of the Society in 1608; it introduces a new element of permanent guidance into the Exercises.* A new and strong movement in favour of retreats for the masses of the faithful may be said to have begun in this century; in England they were chiefly promoted by Father Plater. While popular missions are preached to the people at large, I do not see why retreats should not be preached in many churches to those who may wish to follow them; why should we not try to help more to solid holiness? Retreats have also spread outside Ignatius' own communion; it may well be that his method is the best for making the most of whatever positive belief anyone possesses, and whenever it is applied seriously, God's grace will not be idle. To be applied seriously, however, it must be used to apply definite belief, not to test experience.

* As an example of adaptation, I may perhaps be allowed to name my own retreat manual, *Thy Love and Thy Grace* (Herder, London, 6s.).

In conclusion, let me remind you that our Lord bids us be wise as serpents and simple as doves (Matt. x. 16); since He orders it, we can safely call it good to obey, provided the precept be rightly understood. It seems best explained of being simple as doves in desiring the end, our last and supreme and all-pervading end, God Himself, and of being wise as serpents in selecting the means to the end, both for ourselves and for others. Ignatius eminently fulfilled this precept—not that he or his ever thought or taught that a holy end could sanctify an evil means—and the Spiritual Exercises are perhaps the chief embodiment alike of his simple zeal for the glory of God and of his wisdom in promoting it.

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SOME NOTES ON THE ROMAN CONTROVERSY

AT different periods in the history of the English Church the controversy with Rome has become specially urgent, sometimes owing to the circumstances of the day, sometimes because it was deliberately entered upon from one side or the other. In either case it was, unfortunately, apt to be carried on with bitterness. This was an offence against Christian charity, and as such, brought its own punishment: sins, even of taste rather than of malice, always do so. It is not controversy in itself that is bad: what offends is the controversial spirit: controversy, properly carried on, aims at the discovery or the proper statement of truth. Any exaggeration, or any attempt to score off an opponent, besides causing bitterness at the time, very often hampers future controversialists, or even writers sincerely anxious to state the truth and facts as they are. Of this, the history of this long and recurrent controversy gives many illustrations. The battle has moved over so many fields, for each of which expert knowledge is needed, that even for competent scholars or fair-minded writers (and others not of these classes have too often entered the lists) slips have been only too easy. A wish to understand the other side has not always existed, and even when it has existed, ignorance of some parts of the vast field of controversy has led to mistakes, and to the occupation of untenable positions. Even technical terms, familiar to one side, have been misunderstood by the other. The title "Ecumenical Bishop," for instance, if some Eastern writers were (or are) right in contending that it only meant a

Bishop with jurisdiction over those who inhabited his district, would be a case in point. The tax-lists for issue of indulgences is another. The official charges for issue were misunderstood as payment for absolution. Misstatements too have been common, and have sometimes deceived even the soundest of scholars. Controversy has given, as it were, supplies of oxygen to expiring legends, and Döllinger was justified in reproaching Mosheim for his acceptance of the curious story (oddly enough Roman in its origin) of Pope Joan.

Ignorance, too, has sometimes shown itself unexpectedly, as, for instance, when (during the investigation of Anglican orders at Rome) an enquiry was sent to England whether Cranmer had been consecrated under the First or the Second Book of Edward VI. Happily legends once taken as true have, for the most part, died, even if their deathbed scenes have been unduly prolonged, as when Monsignor Barnes seemed to think that there must be something in the Nag's Head fable. Deliberate misstatements have been even commoner and more difficult to get rid of: we may remember that J. R. Green declared that, if a lie was only repeated often enough and long enough, at last you would get some eminent historian to believe it, and then its vitality would be assured. I remember hearing Dr. Verrall, when called up to respond for "Historians" at a dinner of Lord Acton's Historical Society, indignantly declaring his unfitness to respond because his veracity had never been impugned. After all, historians are not so bad as all that: our pathway, for instance, through early Church History, is immensely easier because of Duchesne (only the Italian translation of his Early Church History, I believe, has achieved the index, and translations, as we in England are often unpleasantly reminded, are often untrustworthy); other scholars only less great have also helped us.

The same is becoming truer even for Reformation history, especially perhaps for England. Even biographies are now safer ground. Denifle's attack on Luther, disfigured, it is true, by bitterness, but invaluable for his catena of passages on Justification, cleared the atmosphere and led to a victory of scholarship over legend. H. Böhmer's *Luther in Light of Recent Research* is an accurate and brilliant sketch, which should be more generally known. It is true, of course, that the Lutheran standpoint and Lutheran argument does not so much concern us Anglicans, as we feel, for instance, when we read Hase's learned apologetic in its original German or its English translation by the late Dr. Streane. But it is always well to know the truth, and accurate history has cleared up much. The history of the Reformation Papacy has been illuminated by Pastor,

fuller and more candid than Janssen, who, nevertheless, gave a side of history which needed statement. And for later times down to A.D. 1870 we have Nielsen's *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century* (another work happily translated, but again less well known than it should be), which Lord Acton once told me he thought the best history of the Papacy yet written. And a work of equal importance, although for another and longer period, is Leclercq's French translation of Hefele's *History of Councils*, enriched by the editor's invaluable notes, although we still await the coming volume on the Council of Trent, difficult as that will be to write owing to the enormous bulk of both original matter and modern investigations. For the Early Church, this work with its many volumes is indispensable, and at various periods of the Middle Ages, such as the eleventh century and the Councils of the fourteenth, it is an ample and trustworthy guide. It is thus easy to see that a fair treatment of the controversy, always necessary, is now easier than it was of old. What is now needed is a calm historical treatment, which we have sometimes seemed to be nearing, and which would be all the more welcome because of occasional and unpleasant outbursts on the one side or the other.

The rise and growth of historical criticism has, to a large extent, and in many directions, affected the question, and tendencies of various kinds have also altered its statement and its treatment. For a long time after the Reformation the argument moved around the claims of the Papacy, the independence of the English Church, and incidentally the matter of Royal Supremacy. Under the first head the English Reformers appealed to the New Testament and to the Primitive Church. Jewel, for instance, and Laud in a later century (as we can see from his controversies with Fisher), had an extensive knowledge of the Fathers, comparable to that found among the learned Benedictines, the Bollandists, and the learned Gallicans, such as Fleury (whose Ecclesiastical History is still most useful, and, for the eighth to the eleventh centuries, almost as good as any we have) and Bossuet. It is very disconcerting to find an ultramontane French writer like Baunard, who has written a volume, informative but biassed, on the French Church (A.D. 1800–1900), rejoicing in the displacement of Fleury, with "his Gallican poison" from French seminaries, in favour of a later but very inferior modern work. On the constitutional side, the case of Gallicanism was much like that of Anglicanism, and there was thus natural sympathy between England and France. This has been well treated by Figgis, in his lecture on National Churches in the little book *Our Place in Christendom* (Longmans, 1916), which, like his other lecture in the same book

on Councils and Unity, is too little known. He has in the same book something about Febronius, a German representative of Gallican knowledge and principles in the eighteenth century, whose work "De statu ecclesiæ et legitima potestate Romani Pontificis" created much stir. In England, however, in the later eighteenth century, patristic learning became rarer; this was due, very largely, to concentration on the Deistic controversy and philosophy. It was left for the Tractarians to attempt its revival, and here Pusey, with great learning (shown, for instance, in his treatment of Eucharistic doctrine, which he could handle the better owing to his full knowledge of the Augsburg Confession and Lutheran doctrine), wrote most effectively and from an irenic standpoint unhappily rare.

A knowledge of the Council of Trent with its many interesting discussions was commoner in England before the nineteenth century than it has been since, and this has been a misfortune. Leaving doctrine aside, the questions there raised about the powers and jurisdictions of bishops, and especially of their relation to the Papacy, are both important and significant. The papal power had grown at the expense of the episcopate by a long process of development, and there were many, not so much among the Roman Curialists as among the ordinary members, who laid great stress upon the episcopate. A knowledge of Trent is really essential if we wish to understand the conditions of the Reformation. Not only these discussions of jurisdiction, papal and episcopal, but the pleas from France, Germany, and Poland for the use of the vernacular in the Mass, for the administration of the chalice to the laity, and for clerical marriage appeared at Trent, and after the Council the use of vernacular and administration in both kinds were left to the discretion of the Papacy, then granted partially in the Habsburg territories, but soon recalled.

Brent's vigorous English translation of Sarpi's great work is really a literary classic. In some editions Jewel's *Letter to Scipio* is printed with it; this is an admirable, vigorous, and learned Anglican *Apologia*: here Jewel is at his best: in his diffuse controversies with Harding he ranges widely over doctrinal points, about which he sympathized too strongly with continental reformers: the modern and accurately historical interpretation of the 39 Articles as an attempt at wide inclusiveness belonged more to Parker and civil statesmen than to him: our standpoint is different from his and rather that of Parker. But the *Letter to Scipio* is another matter: he shows his wide historic learning, and in particular his knowledge of the fifteenth-century Councils helps to build up a solid argument: here he dealt with much that was often forgotten in later times, and

unfortunately so, for Constance is a critical matter in papal controversies: but Jewel knew, as he expressed himself elsewhere, that "the supremacy of the Pope was the assuaging of controversy": in this way he went to the heart of the matter.

The Papacy, which had so long striven to postpone the Council, found itself unable to guide the discussions on episcopacy to the desired end, and so this great matter was left unsettled formally. But practically the Papacy had triumphed in spite of the Spanish advocates of episcopacy. Papacy and Episcopate represented rival principles of Church government: the attempt to inspire, to govern, and to control the episcopate by the Papacy had begun in the eleventh century, and begun, it should not be forgotten, in the interests of spiritual reform. It is a great mistake to see in it solely or chiefly a search for power. That was a danger inherent in the movement for reform directed by the Papacy, and it was a danger which grew greater as time went on. And at Trent the earnestness, skill, and ability of the new-born Jesuit Society made itself felt: a useful ally of the Papacy, it grew to be its master: if, on the one hand, the Society can claim the greatest share in the spiritual triumphs of the counter-Reformation, on the other hand it is responsible for a real degradation of the episcopate, shown by the Quinquennial Faculties granted to bishops, and by the loss of conciliar independence at the Vatican in 1870 compared with Trent. The appeal of the Anglican Reformation and of the Elizabethan Settlement, as Parker formulated it and as later centuries have worked it out, was to the primitive episcopacy.

It is true, of course, that the English Church was to have its dangers from the side of the State: the attempt of the Long Parliament to turn Royal Supremacy into Parliamentary Supremacy was only too successful and has left formidable difficulties to face. But it is idle to speak or to write as if the English Church alone suffered in this respect. It is seen everywhere in the Middle Ages: Concordats after Constance, at Bologna, with Napoleon the First, agreements with Bavaria in medieval days and even with Lutheran Prussia in later times, bear witness to it; the history of the Papacy itself, not only in its worst period, but often since, and with the right of exclusion possessed by the great Powers, often exercised and always in the background, are witnesses to the same force. But these are facts of history too often overlooked. So the Papacy, and the Russian Church under its control, is made to appear as a vast institution, purely spiritual in its administration and government, uninfluenced, as other religious bodies might be, by the civil power or political considerations. No picture could well be more unhistorical.

The controversies under Elizabeth and James I. centred so much on the oath of allegiance and its terms that its present interest is smaller. But that part which dealt with the Fathers and history is different. Laud, whose tone was admirable, recurs again and again to the addition of the *Filioque* to the Nicene Creed, made as he says by a general, if indefinite, assent of the Western Church, and not by any papal decision. In more recent days Fr. Puller appeals similarly to the eleventh-century introduction of the Porrection of the eucharistic vessels into the Ordination Rite, which again was due to a general and widespread process of episcopal regulation and not to any single papal act.

A full sketch of the papal claims should, of course, begin with the so-called Petrine passages in the New Testament. Little can be added to the candid historical work of Lightfoot in his *Apostolic Fathers*. The passages fit in with the personal gifts of St. Peter and his impulsive readiness for leadership. It is not so easy to read into them anything of an official Primacy, and any devolution upon a successor is more doubtful still. On the other hand, as to the connection of St. Peter with Rome, it is safest to accept with Lightfoot the evidence, scanty but satisfactory, for the Apostle's martyrdom at Rome.*

The Patristic evidence is well known, and has often been tersely summarized, and is hard for Roman apologists to explain away. With the growing assertion of Infallibility and its dogmatic definition in 1870 there has been an increasing tendency to lay stress on St. Luke xxii. 24-32, but here the convincing catena of forty-four patristic interpretations, unfavourable to the later Roman view, given by Ketteler of Mainz at the Vatican Council (printed in Friedrich's *Documenta*), should not be forgotten. And it is curious to notice that at Rome stress was long laid significantly on SS. Peter and Paul, the Apostolic Roman martyrs. One of the strongest tendencies up to *c.* A.D. 250 was to venerate local martyrs, as at Lyons and Smyrna; so the observance of saints' days arose. It was thus that Rome became a place of pilgrimage sanctified by Apostolic memories. Not until the century of St. Boniface, so significant for Roman power and control, did "the threshold of St. Peter" supersede, except in some official survivals, "the threshold of SS. Peter and Paul." Increasing stress was being laid upon

* A recent American writer, Professor Merrill, chooses to take Lightfoot's conclusion that if we reject the evidence for a martyrdom *at Rome* we know nothing of St. Peter's end as meaning that we must accept it in order to know something. What Lightfoot (a great historian as well as theologian) meant was that if we did not accept a martyrdom at Rome we could not assume a martyrdom elsewhere. A writer who gives a needlessly diffuse discussion of historical criticism should not have accused a greater scholar of such a weakness.

St. Peter's Primacy and its devolution to successors, which has to be read into the New Testament, and does not appear in the sub-Apostolic Church.

The growth of papal power is naturally most marked under great individual Popes. But there is an early appearance of vigour under Damasus (A.D. 366–384), with its disputed election, and the rescript of the Emperor Gratian (*c.* A.D. 380) ordering civil help for enforcing depositions of bishops by Damasus and other prelates or by a council; a distinction, however, was made by which bishops in more distant regions were to be tried by their metropolitans, whose trials were to be before the Pope or local judges appointed by him: in cases of unfair trial, an appeal lay to the Pope or a local council. These regulations roughly followed the well-known Canon of Sardica (A.D. 343), which (as Duchesne points out) itself remained inactive for some century or so. About the same time under Valentinian I. and Gratian there were other extensions of Roman jurisdiction: metropolitans in the West were placed under papal control, and a right of appeal to the Pope was given to other Western bishops. This was an extension to the whole West of earlier jurisdiction over the "suburbicarian" dioceses of S. Italy, Sardinia, and Corsica. Here was the definite beginning of a historic process, to be carried still further under that great Pope Nicholas I. (A.D. 858–867), intensified under the reforming Popes of the eleventh century, Leo IX. and Gregory VII., and definitely established in the thirteenth century. No historic growth can be more easily traced, and, broadly speaking, it was often a wholesome process in a changing world of theological disputes and political disorder. We ought not to see in it merely the results of ambition; very often it was, indeed, well that strong and righteous men, such as Gregory the Great, should see what they could do, and utilize their responsibilities or possibilities before God and man. But it was not always so with later Popes.

Yet there is another curious side to the picture, and that is the existence of a series of forged documents, of which the eighth-century Donation of Constantine is the best known. Its date can be fixed fairly certainly, and throughout the Middle Ages it was accepted along with the later Forged Decretals. But an earlier forgery existed in the *Acta Silvestri*, which gave the legend of the leper Constantine's baptism by the Pope, and the subsequent gifts to the Church. This forgery was of Eastern origin, and was used by some Eastern writers in the fifth century, say about A.D. 470 or so. The story it gives is in itself sufficient foundation for many later papal claims to sovereignty, taken in the very mixed sense of medieval thought, and to peculiar power, spiritual and civil, in the Papacy.

And this suggests another consideration often left aside: the connection between the growth of the Papacy and medieval thought. From the days of Constantine onwards civil and religious authority were strangely intertwined. There were not assumed, as Bryce conceived it, two opposed societies, Church and State (the modern view), there was one Christian society, with two hierarchies, civil and religious, working together and often (as it looks to modern eyes) interfering in each other's spheres. This is what Figgis so clearly and conclusively taught us. The change from the earlier to the modern conception marks the transition from medieval to modern times. The growth of the Papacy is one part of the process.*

In a society with such a ruling conception, documents like the *Acta Silvestri* had decisive influence. And later again, when St. Thomas Aquinas was writing against the Greeks, Urban IV. sent him a catena of passages from St. Cyril (mainly forged) which had been sent to him. These passages St. Thomas accepted, and his clear (and influential) statement of papal authority is mainly based upon them. Thus we get the authoritative principles of the thirteenth century.†

The present argument on the Roman side naturally deserts the discussion of Anglican orders, settled for Roman writers by a papal utterance, although the historical argument remains.‡ More stress is laid on the reign of Elizabeth than on that of Henry VIII., probably because the reassertion of papal authority under Mary was as clearly the work of the State as was its rejection under Henry VIII. Very much is made of the persecution of Roman Catholics under Elizabeth, milder though that was than the more concentrated Marian persecution. In this matter each side must repent the sins of their forefathers, but England with its earlier and more thorough acceptance of religious toleration, years ahead of other powers, need not even make the obvious and crushing retort.

The controversy will for the future turn, as Cardinal Bourne in his Easter Day sermon at York made it turn, on the continuity of the English Church. That involves the rights of National Churches, which again is a matter of history. Up to the eleventh century the episcopate was nearly everywhere national, and papal control of it was relatively small. This

* Roman apologists, especially of the more controversial type, refuse to allow any historic growth. In one of the tracts published by the Catholic Truth Society (which some kindly person sent me with a view to my conversion) we are told that the whole Papal power was in operation by A.D. 451. We are bidden to see Clement commanding the Church at Corinth with full papal power, recognized, *e.g.*, by St. Irenæus, who used "convenire ad" to mean "agree with"! A growth is "untrue"!

† See Reusch, in the Proceedings of the University of Munich, 1889; Sparrow-Simpson, *Infallibility*, p. 51 *seq.*

‡ Denny and Lacey's *De Hierarchia Anglicana* is really unanswerable. So too is Dr. Swete's admirable lecture on the Bull *Apostolica Curae*.

can be conclusively shown for England, France, Germany, and Spain. Afterwards we come to the period when Canon Law became one general system for all ecclesiastics, even if monastics and friars were exempted from episcopal control. But here we cross the Forged Decretals, accepted and with vast influence. This is the medieval period of the Papacy at its height and we are too often told to accept deductions from a survey of it as truths for all times and all places. As that period passes away, we come to the great Councils of the West, asserting, as they do, the supremacy of General Councils, even above the Papacy. We come to the great vigour of the great modern States. We are now left with the enunciation of Papal Infallibility on the one side; on the other, the historic episcopate, the supremacy of General Councils, and the rights of National Churches. The English Church can appeal to the Primitive Church with its Episcopacy, to the present and the future with their vigorous national life against a few medieval centuries, when papal guidance became a tyranny, too often intent upon temporal and less spiritual ends, and when abuses, testified to at Trent and too slowly reformed, moreover flourished. We of the English Church can view the issue calmly. Its case can only be met by the assumption, impossible to prove and contradicted by historic facts, that what is true for some two medieval centuries is true for all times and for ever.

J. P. WHITNEY.

Note.—This article is meant as a general, not a detailed statement. A useful handbook is C. Mirbt, *Quellen Zur Geschichte Papsttums* (latest edition). For the medieval history, Imbart de la Tour for France, Hauck for Germany, Altamira in the *Cambridge Medieval History*, vols. II. and III., for Spain, and Stubbs for England, along with Hefele-Leclercq's *Councils* (in French), justify the statements. The use of the *pallium* as an evidence of Papal power is unfortunate for its advocates, as the gradual growth can be clearly traced (see Duchesne's *Origins of Christian Worship*, S.P.C.K., and the various Church dictionaries): it was at first a civil ornament; it then became ecclesiastical. In France and Africa all bishops seem to have worn it: the Council (I.) of Macon (A.D. 583) by its Canon VI. ordered all bishops to wear it at Mass: later MSS. significantly change "bishops" into "archbishops": Fulgentius of Ruspe in North Africa (468-538), a humble ascetic, was peculiar in not wearing it: St. Paulinus only received his pall after six years' work and his flight from York, and certainly consecrated Honorius for Canterbury before that. Even in the eleventh century, which marked a great change, St. Anselm was a year before applying for it, although Pope John VIII. had ordered a request for it to be made within three months: in the interval he consecrated Battle Abbey and a suffragan. Up to the eleventh century bishops were generally appointed by the civil power: local churches had a voice, but the Papacy is rarely heard. Fr. Puller, *e.g.*, points out (*Orders and Jurisdiction*, p. 158) that in England between A.D. 669 and 1050 there were consecrated 576 bishops, but in no case had the Papacy a share in this.

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

THE World Conference on Faith and Order which met in Lausanne, August 3-21, if it failed to reach the level for which its promoters hoped, was nevertheless a remarkable gathering. Neither the number of the Churches represented nor the total number of delegates came up to expectation. One may safely say that with the exception of the Church of Rome every denomination of any importance was represented, and all the more important by delegates from all over the world. It was impossible that Rome should be represented, but that does not mean that Rome was not interested, especially in the persons of her most far-seeing thinkers. The important thing is that Rome was remembered. Again, it was impossible to obtain anything like proportional representation of the different denominations. For the purpose of the Conference that did not matter. The delegates were free to state their opinions. They were not commissioned to influence the polity of their Churches.

There was a strong delegation from the Orthodox Churches of the East. Archbishop Germanos in his address at the opening session said finely: "Let us call to mind the deep signification of our Mission, being at the same time fully conscious that we all of us have a grave responsibility for the wasteful divisions of the Churches, and feel repentance for the neglect we have hitherto permitted of this duty, and devote ourselves to this work without prejudice and with the requisite tranquillity."

It was a great pleasure to the delegates of the Church of England to meet representatives of the sister Churches of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, and of the daughter Churches of Canada, South Africa, Australasia, India; to kneel in the little Anglican church beside a representative of the Holy Catholic Church of Japan, and receive the Blessed Sacrament from the Bishop of Dornakal, or the Bishop of New York, using the revised American Liturgy. It was an object lesson as to the world-wide activities of our Church, and prepared one to meet the representatives of Protestant denominations from all over the world.

The great Cathedral of Lausanne looks sadly bare with its two bare Holy Tables standing in the chancel, while the exaltation of the preaching of the Word above the Sacraments is symbolized by the importance of the pulpit to which all seats turn. Things are what they are, and we must be content to face facts. The great organ pealed out Handel's music. Both in the Cathedral and in the Aula of the University familiar hymns sung in three languages sounded much better than might have been expected, and the pauses for silent prayer were always

impressive. Bishop Brent's sermon was worthy of the occasion, an outspoken meditation on St. John xvii. 20-23, with an appeal to prepare ourselves spiritually for conference and controversy.

We met in the great Hall of the University for the opening Session. Bishop Brent was unanimously elected President, and fulfilled his duties courageously although struggling with ill-health. He had an efficient Vice-Chairman in Principal Garvie, whose capacity to speak in three languages was a valuable asset. The principal addresses were published in all three languages, but other speeches were translated twice over, which was somewhat wearisome except when the time limit reduced the translations to very meagre dimensions! There were many more who wished to speak in the afternoons than could be heard. This was inevitable, but on the whole all points of view gained a fair hearing. My own anticipation that the most interesting part of the Conference would be the free speaking in committees, and the opportunities of quiet conversations with members of other denominations from across the seas, was fully realized.

It was as good for all Catholics to hear the outspoken address of Dr. Cadman, President of the Federation of Christian Churches in the U.S.A., as it was for Protestants to hear the address on the Ministry of the Church in which the Bishop of Bombay pleaded eloquently for Episcopacy. It was still better to hear Catholic teaching on the Creed and the Sacraments frankly stated in Committee. The proceedings in Committees were private, but it is no violation of confidence to say how deeply moved some of our separated brethren were when they found themselves discussing deep mysteries of sacramental teaching in a spirit free from controversy. It was perhaps best of all to have a talk on the hillside looking out over the Lake of Geneva with a Presbyterian Professor about the experience of the United Church of Canada. For I cannot doubt that what one may call group reunions help towards Reunion on a larger scale, and it is precisely in vast territories like Canada, as on the Mission Field, that the need of Episcopal oversight makes itself most felt, and its value is most obviously seen. It is not only in the clash of arguments that Truth will find its way to final victory. After all, Christianity is a life, and from the Catholic point of view it is experience of the sacramental life that gives us most confidence in the doctrines which are for us tests of the validity of that experience.

The Conference, despite all temptations, was faithful to its true aim of exploring the differences between the Catholic and

Protestant points of view. As the Bishop of Bombay put it: "This is a Conference about truth, not about reunion. We engage in it because we desire the visible unity of Christ's Church on earth."

The original draft agenda led to serious misunderstandings, for the Subjects Committee published propositions which were held to imply that an effort was made to determine in advance the conclusions which were to be reached by the Conference. The draft of propositions suggested for discussion was accordingly printed as an appendix, and the main subjects were stated without such comment. After I. The Call to Unity, a new subject was introduced: II. The Church's Message to the World—the Gospel. On this subject we had an eloquent address from Dr. Deissmann. As far as I can understand it is part of the Protestant principle of exalting the Ministry of the Word above the Sacrament to emphasize the power of the Gospel as a message, independent of any Church organization, to convert souls. We do not deny it, but would emphasize also the fact that on the Day of Pentecost the Apostle Peter urged all whose hearts the Spirit of God had touched to enter into the Fellowship through the Sacrament of Baptism. Dr. Deissmann spoke of Jesus Christ Himself, Son of God and Son of Man, standing "in the centre of the Gospel," but he was silent about the Presence and Power of the Holy Spirit, whose task, as St. Paul teaches, is to lead men to confess Jesus as the Lord. We must do some hard thinking on this line. I do not think we shall be led to argue with Dr. Deissmann that "the Church must give up the attempt to demonstrate the rationality of the Kingdom of God to the healthy intelligence of mankind." But we can cordially endorse what follows: "It must have courage and joyfulness to proclaim paradox to the world and to expect paradox from the world: the paradox that by reason of the nearness of God and of His Anointed we must be new men, and that in following God's anointed we must be the salt of the earth and the light of the world! It must preach the fearfulness of sin and the glory of grace."

To return to the programme: Subject III. was The Nature of the Church, upon which followed IV. The Church's Common Confession of Faith, V. The Church's Ministry, VI. The Sacraments, VII. The Unity of Christendom and the Relation thereto of existing Churches. Space will only permit of comment upon three of these.

The statement on the Church's Common Confession of Faith is on the whole one of the most satisfactory, as the following paragraph proves:

"Notwithstanding the difference in doctrine among us, we

are united in a common Christian Faith which is proclaimed in the Holy Scriptures and is witnessed to and safeguarded in the Œcumenical Creed commonly called the Nicene, and in the Apostles' Creed, which Faith is continuously confirmed in the spiritual experience of the Church of Christ."

Subject V.—The statement on the Christian Ministry will be scanned with meticulous care and is open to criticism, but the theologians who drafted it were concerned to point out differences rather than to provide a formula which might become a basis of agreement in a reunited Church. That it is open to misconstruction is proved by the fact that the following paragraph was by some understood to go beyond the Lambeth Encyclical in the direction of acknowledging Congregational Orders:

"In view of the fact that Episcopal, Presbyteral and Congregational Order are each believed by many to be essential to the order of the Church, therefore we recognize these several elements must all, under conditions which require further study, have an appropriate place in the order of life of a reunited Church, and that each separate communion, recalling the abundant blessing of God vouchsafed to its Ministry in the past, should gladly bring to the common life of the united Church its own spiritual treasures." If the word "polity" were substituted for "order" it could be made plain that from the Catholic point of view there is only one valid form of ordination —*i.e.*, episcopalian. But the fact that the Anglican Ordinal provides that Priests should assist the Bishop in the laying-on of hands in the Ordination of Priests really satisfies the claim of Presbyterian polity. And the care that is taken to secure the approval of the congregation at his home before the ordination of a deacon, and again of the congregation to which he ministers before his ordination as a priest, includes what is essential in Congregational polity, though the method might well be improved.

Subject VI.—We had three papers of outstanding importance, by Archbishop Chrysostom on the Orthodox Doctrine of the Holy Mysteries, by Dr. Vernon Bartlet on the Evangelical Doctrine of the New Testament as distinguished from the later Catholic Doctrine, and by Canon Quick.

The statement contains the following remarkable paragraphs: "We testify to the fact that the Christian world gives evidence of an increasing sense of the significance and value of Sacraments, and would express our belief that this movement should be fostered and guided as a means of deepening the life and experience of the Churches. In this connection we recognize that the Sacraments have special reference to the corporate life

and fellowship of the Church and that the Grace is conveyed by the Holy Spirit, taking of the things of Christ and applying them to the soul." "We agree that Sacraments are of divine appointment and that the Church ought thankfully to receive them as divine gifts."

The divergent views of those who hold that there are Seven Sacraments and that for their valid administration there must be a proper form, a proper matter, and a proper ministry, also with regard to the mode or manner of "the Real Presence," the conception of the Commemoration and the Sacrifice, the relation of the elements to the Grace conveyed, etc., are clearly stated.

What is needed above all is a starting-point for future study. Dr. Bartlet's scholarly exposition of his own "Evangelical point of view," which is not identical with what an Anglican Evangelical learns from the Prayer Book, deserves all the attention which it is likely to receive from theologians. History repeats itself. All that has been slowly won for our Church in the direction of a more Catholic mind about the Blessed Sacrament can only be slowly learnt all the world over. Some striking words of Dr. Brown may be applied here: "Deeper than our intellectual differences and more disastrous in their effect are our suspicions and our fears." He went on to speak of our Gospel of hope. "God has not yet spoken His last word or His best." Archbishop Germanos after this "morning speech" called on the Conference to stand in silent prayer. And to no subject does this appeal to put away suspicion apply more appositely than to the whole doctrine of the Sacraments.

In conclusion, when we try to estimate the value of the Conference we may well say with Bishop Gore that "we can conceive of a Conference on a smaller scale which would have been more practicable than this, but we have been led to seek complete reunion of the Christian Church Universal. So we begin to envisage in our minds a conception of the Church on a basis which will be tolerable to the Catholic judgment, and such as can form a substructure for building up all those elements in the life of the Spirit which have been identified with Protestantism."

A. E. BURN.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

THERE seems no limit to the reverberations of the Prayer Book controversy. We have recently heard of a missionary who was visiting young men's clubs in a coast district in Japan; and at one place, before he began his address, questions were invited, among which was the following: "Why are the English changing their Prayer Book?"

We are glad to publish this month a review of Dr. N. P. Williams's Bampton Lectures on "The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin," a work which is in the best tradition of Anglican doctrinal theology. The book has been the subject of two powerful expositions by Dr. Harris in the *Church Union Gazette*, which deserve a wide public. We are somewhat surprised to find that Dr. Williams does not allude in his book to William Law's *The Spirit of Prayer*, one of the choicest works of that great eighteenth-century divine, and one which anticipates in many ways Dr. Williams's view of a pre-cosmic Fall.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

(*a*) LUKE xiii. 4.

ἢ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ δέκα ὀκτὼ ἐφ' οὓς ἔπεσεν ὁ πύργος ἐν τῷ Σιλωὰμ καὶ ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτούς, δοκεῖτε ὅτι αὐτοὶ ὀφειλέται ἐγένοντο παρὰ πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς κατοικοῦντας Ἰερουσαλήμ; οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν. . . .
"But the doctrine that in this world the individual gets exactly his deserts is not one which experience bears out. . . . It was a greater than Job who said, 'Those eighteen upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all that dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you nay'; . . . " (Streeter, *Reality*, p. 61).

When the *Titanic* foundered, I remember hearing an eloquent sermon protesting against the idea that the disaster could be called a "judgment of God," and the above text was that upon which it was based. Dr. Streeter uses it here for much the same purpose; but surely the text when *accurately quoted—i.e.*, with its final words *ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὴ μετανοήσητε πάντες ὡσαύτως ἀπολεῖσθε*—has an almost diametrically opposite meaning.

Our Lord does *not* say that the eighteen were not sinners, but that they were no worse than His hearers *who would likewise perish unless they repented*. The obvious implication is that it *was* a punishment for sin which those present would share unless they amended their ways.

MAURICE FROST.

(*b*) Ps. ii. 11, 12.

During the course of a very interesting lecture which he delivered on the Psalms at Winchester about ten years ago, the late Professor Burney propounded the following simple emendation of the well-known difficulty in Ps. ii. He proposed to alter וְגִילוּ to רַגְלוֹ and omit the בַּר, which he thought had been accidentally repeated from the previous בִּרְעָדָה. The text would then run as follows: אֶת־יְחוָה בְּיִרְאָה רַגְלוֹ בִּנְצָדָה נַשְּׁקוּ עָבְדוּ, and the translation would then make sense: "Serve the Lord with fear, his foot with trembling kiss, lest he be angry. . . ."

R. S. T. HASLEHURST.

NOTES

"IMPUTED RIGHTEOUSNESS" (Rom. iv.)

In Romans iv. the verb λογίζομαι occurs ten times, about twice as often as in all the rest of the N.T. Six times the translators of A. V. rendered it by "impute," which Cruden, doubtless in accordance with their meaning, defines as: "Signifies (1) Freely to account or ascribe to a person that which he himself hath not, nor did not (Rom. iv. 22)." In this he was followed up to our own day; "the awfully defective record is treated for a divinely valid reason, as if it were, what it is not, good," wrote Bishop Moule on Romans in 1902. But a newer school of thought repudiates this view. In 1912 W. H. Moberley in *Foundations* declared that "the suggestion of the 'imputation' to men of a righteousness that is not theirs implies an atmosphere of artificiality and insincerity that is intolerable. . . . God sees men as they really are." And later writers have been not less outspoken. St. Paul's argument is characterized as "forensic," and people have refused to owe their justification to a "legal fiction."

But there seems another possibility. St. Paul has a curious knack of being beforehand with the psychologists, and it seems not impossible that, looking at the question from another point of view, it may appear that he has been so again. Anyhow, he does not appear to have thought of the new righteousness as being forensic, since he expressly says that it was "apart from the law" and becomes effective through "a law of faith"—that is, the whole problem is moved into another plane (Rom. iii. 21, 27).

Dean Bennett makes this psychological point in writing on Rom. v. in *M. Coué and his Gospel*: "If you want to be holy, says St. Paul . . . by faith make a picture of yourself 'complete in Christ' . . . a thought will get down among the believer's springs of action and will work." That is, use auto-suggestion.

With Rom. iv., however, we can take a further step. If Rom. v. treats of the power of *auto*-suggestion, Rom. iv. deals with the *hetero*-suggestion on which alone that auto-suggestion can be validly based. There is, say practitioners of both spiritual and mental healing, some effective force set in action upon others by our thinking of them not as they are, but as we would have them be. And *that*, says St. Paul, is what God does in "imputing righteousness" to us. Christ appears before the Father "for us," and the Father "looks on us as found in Him." There is no question of a "legal fiction," but of the setting in motion of a spiritual force. Whatever is the truth of what we call hetero-suggestion, that God is exercising upon us. No one else has authority to do it.

But, says Baudouin (*Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion*), the operator's suggestion can be realized solely on condition that it is accepted by the subject's mind and turned into auto-suggestion, which is, as Dean Bennett points out, the step St. Paul inculcates in his next chapter. Indeed, Baudouin follows the teaching of St. Paul closely. The process of suggestion is twofold: (1) The idea is accepted by the mind of the subject; (2) this idea works out into action, its realization coming about by subconscious action. St. James and M. Coué both say that a faith without works is dead.

If this view is true, we are "reckoned" as righteous, not by a complicated process of theological jurisprudence, or even because we are in

process of being made righteous, but as the most direct and efficacious method of making us righteous, not by an intellectual approach (Rom. i. 21, 22) nor by a code externally imposed (ii. 17-24), but by direct action on the deepest springs of our personality.

M. D. R. W.

THE VENITE

THE Bishop of Chichester, addressing his Diocesan Council, justified the omission of the last four verses of the Venite as follows: "Many scholars think that these either once stood by themselves as a separate psalm or belong to some other psalm of which the rest has been lost. Anyhow, they strike quite a different note from the first seven verses" (*The Deposited Book Explained*, p. 12). The Bishop was one of the Bishops "in charge" of the measure, and we may take his explanation as authoritative. Now there is no possible objection to the shortening of a psalm for liturgical use (*cf.* the five verses of Ps. xxxi at Compline), but it is well to point out that modern scholarship treats Ps. xcv as one and indivisible. The praise and jubilation work up to a climax and then intentionally pass into stern warning.

The psalm is liturgical and was used at some festival when, probably, Moses was commemorated. The procession forms outside the Temple and approaches the Presence with a joyful noise of thanksgiving. At verse 6 it enters the precincts and, seeing the sanctuary, the members fall down on their knees in worship, confident that they represent Jehovah's people, His treasured flock. At this point the choir of priests in the sanctuary take up the song and thunder forth a warning oracle, speaking in the name of Jehovah. The people in days of old, though they saw God's works, rebelled—see that ye harden not your hearts (see Gunkel's Commentary).

The Venite is an ideal introduction to worship, representing the joy of those who are glad to go into the House of the Lord, tempered with the solemn warning, borne out by the Church's past experience, of the danger of hardening their hearts. It would be easy to bring out the meaning by a change in the music. At "Today, if ye will hear his voice" the men only might sing, at a slower pace, the original tempo being resumed with full choir at the Gloria.

Psalm lxxxi is an example of a warning oracle, 6-16, following a festal song, 1-5. In xxii a complaint turns into a song of praise at *v.* 22. In lx the priest begins to speak at 6, following the people's complaint in 1-5. Compare also xxiv, where in *v.* 3 the pilgrims outside the gates ask who is worthy to enter the Holy Place; in 4 the priests reply, the gates are opened, and in 5, 6 the priests chant Jehovah's blessing on the worthy. Another instructive example of the liturgical purpose of the Psalms as recognized by recent criticism is Ps. cvii, which contains four strophes for use as desired in connection with different classes of pilgrims. Thus 23-32 would be used only when a pilgrimage had come by sea.

W. K. L. C.

TWO STUDIES OF THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

I.

Mysterium Fidei de Augustissimo Corporis et Sanguinis Christi Sacrificio atque Sacramento. Auctore Mauritio de la Taille.

Père de la Taille has written a book which purposes to be a detailed and exhaustive history of the Blessed Sacrament. He has shown the evolution of the idea of the Sacrament, embryonic in the Old Testament, and has traced its subsequent development. He deals with the Holy Eucharist as a sacrifice, and it is sufficient to say that in this section of the book there are to be found more cogent passages, drawn from the earlier patristic writings, in which the term "sacrifice" is used in connection with the Holy Eucharist, than in many of the larger books of the same kind. The writer breaks, too, new ground for original thought, and, inevitably, for controversy in his theory of the relationship of the terms *immolatio* and *oblatio* to sacrifice; then he applies the conclusion drawn from his premises to the Christian sacrifice of the Cross and the Mass. There is, in his scheme, place for the *sacerdos* and the "lay priesthood." His theme gradually expands upon the method of question and answer adopted by Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas. He concludes with a formidable list of Fathers, Popes, Schoolmen, and modern writers, briefly summarizing their views by means of apt quotations upon the Holy Eucharist as a Sacrament.

Book I.—Père de la Taille begins his treatise with a short history of sacrifice, working along the trite highway marked out so clearly by Robertson-Smith in *The Religion of the Semites*. Propitiatory sacrifice and λατρέια "are owed" to God, who has plenary right over life and death, although this fact does not render man mechanical in active service—he subsists for himself, and has *his* power of destroying "res animatas vel inanimatas." This propitiatory form of sacrifice arises originally from the awe of God. From this point Père de la Taille leads up to the distinction between "immolation" and "oblation," a distinction which he preserves, in application, throughout his thesis. "Cujus oblatio potest differre *realiter* ab immolatione," he says, although the effect is always the same in divine acceptance. He proceeds then to the discussion of divers conceptions of sacrifice. Certain post-Tridentine theologians narrowed the concept of all sacrifice into an expression of God's dominion over life and death. Divine majesty is exalted above all the other attributes of God, and the primary object of sacrifice is atonement or "an appropriate transformation of the creature offered," limited by Vasquez to a transformation by *destruction* instead of by *conversion*.

This opens up the whole question of the relationship of the victim to the offerers, and the part which blood, as the symbol of life released by destruction, plays in sacrifice. The writer corrects one-sided views by his claim (Sect. ii. 2, p. 11) that the immolation is only part of the sacrifice, and that it is not a matter of the *de*struction of the victim, necessary as this may be in the sacrificial act, but of the *pro*duction. The oblation or the offering is the truer conception. It is the setting free of the life to a living God to cleanse life here. Having made this point in connection with the two parts of the sacrificial act, Père de la Taille adds, quite generally, that without the presentation of a gift no sacrifice is present. He does not, however, dilate upon the nature and effects of

these gifts, or upon the manner in which they were presented, but closes the first section of his book with an explication of the cause of sacrifice, examined from our point of view—"stipendia peccati mors."

Granted that in sacrifice there must be an outward sign (visible), the immolation or killing of the sacred animals might be effected by those who were not priests, but "ad sacerdotes solos" was the oblation permitted. Thus our Lord permitted His death at the hands of godless men (*i.e.*, the immolation), and yet pleaded the sacrifice eternally; but neither in pre-Christian nor Christian sacrifice can the two terms be used as interchangeable. Père de la Taille expresses it thus: "Patet vel maxime ex sacrificio Christi qui minime seipsum mactavit sed permisit interficiendum Judæis deicidis, quamvis seipsum obtulerit immaculatum Deo (Heb. ix. 14), quod qualiter factum sit infra perpendetur." He postulates that the actual immolation could be unholy, in the modern sense of the word, and yet the oblation itself "pia et religiosa." In the above instance the *mactatio* is the sin of the Jews, but the offering of the results of that *mactatio* is "sanctissima oblatio Christi." If these terms, *oblatio* and *immolatio*, are always used in their proper connotation, the writer, with some cogency, claims that such an interpretation of them will act as a balance between the diverse views upon sacrifice, especially in its relation to the Mass. At present the protagonists of various schools of thought use "oblation" and "immolation" respectively, as denoting the "internal sacrifice," when actually they are no more than component parts of it.

From the actual sacrifice of Christ upon the Cross, Père de la Taille proceeds directly to the doctrine of the continuation of that sacrifice in the Eucharist. He takes for his springboard the definition from the Council of Trent: "Si quis dixerit in missa non offerri Deo verum et proprium sacrificium aut quod offerri non sit aliud quam nobis Christum ad manducandum dari. . . ." Christ's sacrifice is true sacrifice, lacking in none of the qualities that are essential to true sacrifice—*visibile et invisibile.*

Elucidatio iii. is an application of the conclusions reached in the preceding reasoning to the Holy Eucharist; the burden of which application is that Jesus in the "Supper" (*cœna*) offered to God the *veritatem* of His Passion. From this unity of the Passion of Christ and the Supper, Père de la Taille leads his reader to a disquisition upon the *apparent* sacrament of bread and wine, and the *real* sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ. Thus a further liaison is made—the Holy Eucharist is identified with the Passion: "Igitur Christus in cœna obtulit suam mortem, id est, dum visus est tractare panem et vinum, revera sacrificavit corpus sui supplicii et sanguinem suæ passionis."

In the section headed "De continuatione cœlesti sacrificii Christi," an attempt is made to crystallize the Roman Catholic position, so erroneously had Paschasius Radbert misstated the entire question. A further connection is made between the sacrifice of the Mass and the Resurrection. The chain of reasoning is obvious. The Body present in the Holy Sacrifice is the perfect Body of the Resurrection, and not, as Paschasius Radbert appears to have taught, the passionable Body of Christ. The writer is sufficiently emphatic that after the immolation and oblation of our Lord on the Cross, there is no *repetition* in the Mass of such an immolation. The offering of the Death and Resurrection is continued; for which dogmatic exposition he adduces a host of early writers.

Did Christ, in his Resurrection, carry out the priestly office? Using the analogy of the Levites who made the immolation and the priests who made the oblation, the writer shows that it is through the Resurrection only that the *offering* of the risen life of Christ could be made. *Then* he was essentially a Priest, as at the immolation He was essentially a Victim. The Resurrection, he concludes, proves that the sacrifice was "verum et efficax"—accepted by God with a sign, more true than any vouchsafed at the Old Testament sacrifices. The Resurrection is the *pignus* or *sacramentum* of the sacrifice.

The final connection is made in the last section of the book, when Père de la Taille explains the relation of the sacrifice to the Ascension. He bases these conclusions upon the treatise on the Sacrifice of the Mass, written by Benedict XIV. (*De Sacro Sacr. Missæ*). Here is the burden of it. In the earlier Jewish sacrifices the victim was consumed before the altar of holocaust in order that "quicquid in ea vitii esset absumeretur." The smoke was taken up from the cleansed victim "in odorem suavitatis." The treatise continues in application to the sacrifice of Christ. The death of Christ upon the Cross and the Resurrection consumed all that was "mortal" in Christ. In the Ascension, the Victim is taken up "in odorem suavitatis," and gathered to the right hand of God.

Book II.—The second book has for its title "De Sacrificio Ecclesiastico," and its starting-point is the institution of the Eucharistic Rite. After a brief summary of the account taken from the Four Gospels, Père de la Taille shows that not only did Christ institute the rite inextricably bound up with His own Death, Resurrection, and Ascension, but He intended that the Eucharist should be a "Sacrificial Oblation." The writer's line of argument is this: If Christ offered His Body and Blood sacrificially, and, further, commanded us to do as He had done (1 Cor. xi. 25; Luke xxii. 19), it logically follows that we must offer it sacrificially. Working from this foundation, Père de la Taille proceeds to fill in the crevices in his structure. He carefully marks the difference between the *Cœna* (as I shall call the Last Supper) and the Eucharist. At the time of the *Cœna* the immolation was still to be made at the Passion. In the Eucharist we offer only the Victim *already* (*dudum*) immolated. Thus in the *Cœna* the immolation was to come, but in the Eucharist it has come, and we commemorate the Passion. The teaching of the early Fathers is well summed up in the words of Cyril of Jerusalem: "Χριστὸν ἐσφαγιασμένον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἁμαρτημάτων προσφέρομεν. . . . τὴν ἀναιμακτον λατρείαν . . . ἐπὶ τῆς θυσίας ἐκείνης τοῦ ἱλασμοῦ . . ." (*cf.* Cyril, *Cat. Myst.*, v. 10, 7).

In Elucidatio i. we have to consider the heavenly sacrifice as offered by us. Père de la Taille, as his custom is, takes as a basis the work produced upon this subject by one of the great Doctors of the Church, St. Ambrose. Christ offers Himself "as a shadow here"; the true offering is made, eternally, in Heaven. Further evidence is collected from the documents of the "Ordo Missæ," in order to prove that this conception is inherent in the Ordo, and this receives support from references to the Liturgy of St. James. The writer, wisely, condemns all one-sided views, based upon Johannine tradition, which neglect the equally authentic sacrificial teaching of St. Paul and that to be found in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

From this point the position of the Christian Ministry comes under examination. Taking a definition from the Council of Trent, one learns

in what manner the "Heavenly Offering" is still made on earth by the ministers of Christ. Every Eucharist is a new sacrifice, although it is *not a new immolation*, but Christ, who is the Heavenly Priest, is identified with the earthly priest, and, in every new sacrifice, is the *oblator*, while the Victim is the same. Of this St. Augustine says: "per sacerdotium (id est, sacerdotes) Christi . . . sub sacerdote Christi . . . offertur Eucharistia," with which statement it is well to compare that of Eusebius of Cæsarea, "Christus etiam nunc sui inter homines sacerdotii opera per nos ministros perficit." The extracts on page 297 of the book make an invaluable patristic consensus.

Père de la Taille now turns to the place of the Church in regulating the offering of sacrifice. He asserts, dogmatically, that "no sacrifice may or can be offered, truly, to God, except on the part of the whole Church." The Mass, then, is a public, communal service offered through the priests. He anticipates two objections. The priest is not a priest of the Church, but a minister of God. The answer is patent—a priest of the Church and a minister of God are synonyms. The second objection is less easy to rebut. If the oblation and consecration are one act and not two, it follows that if the priest consecrated and did not intend to offer, then *nil efficeret*, because he would lack intention to do what the Church intended. Saurez, in some measure, finds a solution. He agrees that the oblation and consecration are one *subjecto*, but adds that they are two *ratione*. Thus: "*By the consecration*, the bread and wine are changed into the Body and Blood *by God* . . . *by the oblation* the Body of Christ in the Host is offered to God *by men*." The priest makes the consecration in the name of, and by the power of, God, whereas he makes the oblation in the name of himself and all the faithful. He consecrates as the instrument of God; he offers as the "procurator" of the Church.

The whole Church takes part in the offering as a royal Priesthood united to Christ, because by baptism every faithful Catholic is ordained (*ordinatur*) to offer sacrifice through the ministry of the Priesthood, the priests, ordained in a special manner, representing them. No sacrifice, de la Taille concludes, can be valid which is not offered *nomine* and *ex parte* of the entire Church. He adds further, that if sacrifice can only be offered through the whole Church, the Apostles could not have offered the sacrifice of the Eucharist before Pentecost, and from this it follows that, although Christ founded the Church on earth, she was not able to function ethically or doctrinally "non lapso spiritu de cœlo." Chrysostom supports the statement that Christ, because of the falling upon the Apostles of the Holy Spirit, remained in the Church, and especially so by means of the Holy Eucharist. The character of the priest makes no difference to the validity of the sacrifice. Thus Chrysostom: "The Eucharist is the same whoever offers it . . . whether Peter or Paul, it is Christ who sanctifies it through the minister."

In the chapter which the writer styles "De effectione sacrificii Missæ" he asserts "sacrificium consecratione sola . . .," and then considers his proposition in relation to the Epiclesis and the actual words which are essential to the validity of consecration. He admits that the Epiclesis is, specifically, lost to modern Western liturgies, but he claims that the Epiclesis is implied by the prayers in the *Missale Romanum*, especially in the case of the invocation of the Blessed Trinity, and the Angels.

The last part of the book is a comparatively short exposition of the Eucharist considered as a Sacrament. It is subdivided in the following manner:

(*a*) Is the Holy Eucharist a Sacrament? How far can it be so considered?

(*b*) Is the reception of the Eucharist, as a Sacrament, necessary to salvation?

(*c*) In what manner do the Body and Blood of Christ exist in the Sacrament?

As in all his catena of reasoning, the writer begins with a definition (provisional): "Sacramentum intelligitur generaliter signum rei sacræ in quantum est sanctificans homines." The cause of such sanctification is the *Passio Christi*, the "form" (*forma*) is sanctifying Grace; the "end" (*finis*) will be Heavenly Glory. If the Holy Eucharist embraces these three qualities, it must be considered as a Sacrament. First there is the commemoration of the Passion, then the reception of Grace, which is the fruit of the Passion. These two lead to the third, Glory in the Beatific Vision. The *signum* is the Host that is to be received (*manducanda*), the whole signification of such a reception being twofold—the frequent and devout participator is led to celestial blessedness, and, in addition, such a participator is strengthened in this life, while love for his fellow communicants is engendered. This is what Jesus meant when he spoke of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. To make clear the outward unity of Christ and His Church, and the inward or vital unity existing in all who receive Him in the Eucharist, Père de la Taille cites St. Augustine and St. Chrysostom.

There follows an examination, in detail, of the peculiar elements of the Eucharist as a Sacrament compared with the other elements in it. A comparison is drawn between the Eucharist and the other six Sacraments as a method of showing in what manner all of them are intimately connected in purpose and use with the most Holy Sacrament. The writer seems to be hindered in his original thinking by the Tridentine decrees, and the Schoolmen's conception of the meaning of "substance." But he clearly holds it as *de fide* that in the Holy Eucharist, our Lord, in His resurrection Body, is truly, really, actually present, objectively and entirely apart from the receiver. The presence of Christ and the reception of Him have nothing to do with the state of the receiver's mind and soul. Christ here gives Himself under a form of species which is visible to the senses, and which is not, in itself, the true substance or *essentia* of the Body of the Lord.

From this Presence flows Grace, by reason of the incorporation of the recipient with Christ Himself. Thus the grace comes through the Humanity of Christ. This is the *gratia sanctificans* as distinct from the *gratia præveniens* and the *gratia perseverantiæ* of Augustinian theology.

In conclusion, Père de la Taille compares this Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ with the others. Thus both this and the Sacrament of Baptism have a common end—incorporation into Christ. The Eucharist implies incorporation *per seipsam* . . . Christ's true Body and Blood being given to us *per modum cibi*; whereas Baptism is an incorporation into Life. *Pœnitentia*, with the method expressed in Confession, removes the "stumbling block" (*objicem*) to a perfect union with Christ; while Confirmation is the Sacrament through which such strength is given as to make the *objicem* less likely to arise. The Sacra-

ment through which the Grace of Orders comes, is even more intimately bound up with the Eucharist, especially with regard to Sacred Orders. Père de la Taille is clear that the work of the priest is the administration of the sacraments, and not ethical speculation, or social or political activity. The latter are implied in the former. The Sacrament of marriage is itself a symbol of the Holy Eucharist, the union of man and woman *in carne una*. A relationship between Extreme Unction and the most Holy Sacrament will be found on page 575. He sums up his surprisingly complete thesis with the simple conclusion that no person can be incorporated into Christ apart from the Holy Eucharist. It is necessary to salvation.

C. W. R. SQUIRE.

II.

L'Idée du Sacrifice de la Messe. Par M. Lepin, Professeur au Grand Séminaire de Lyon. Paris, 1926.

Père de la Taille's great work on the Eucharistic Sacrifice has provoked another, equally monumental, from M. Lepin. Mgr. Batiffol drew my attention to it in Paris some months ago, and kindly presented me with a copy; and I propose here to give a brief summary of the main argument of the book, which runs to over 800 pages.

Part I. is concerned with the history of the doctrine from the ninth century to the sixteenth. The general tenor of patristic teaching, as cited and developed in these centuries, is to the effect that (1) the Eucharist contains a sacrifice, (2) the Eucharistic sacrifice involves an immolation of Christ, (3) this immolation is purely mystical or representative,(4) this mystical immolation is held to lie either in the Communion (Gregory the Great, Ambrose, Augustine, etc.), or in the Consecration (Isidore of Seville, Bede); but the first of these two views is the prevalent one.

Aquinas draws attention to three actions—Fraction, Consecration, Communion—as taking place "in connection with" (*circa*) the Host. For him, the sacrifice of the Mass consisted essentially in the oblation; and this oblation took the form of sacrifice thanks to certain actions performed in connection with the Host offered—viz., the conversion of the elements into Christ's Body and Blood, the Fraction, and the Communion. St. Thomas says that there is a sacrifice, *si aliquid exhibeatur in cultum divinum, quasi in aliquod sacrum, quod inde fieri debeat, consumendum.*

Part II. is devoted to the history of the doctrine from the Council of Trent to our own day. Post-Tridentine Roman theology exhibits two main and distinct streams of thought on the Eucharistic sacrifice, the one affirming and the other denying a *real immutation* of Christ in the Mass; while several divines adopt various kinds of intermediate positions between the two. The facts can be tabulated as follows:

MAIN THESIS A.	MAIN THESIS B.
Sacrifice requires a real immutation of the matter offered, and in the Eucharist this immutation affects Christ Himself.	Sacrifice does not require a real immutation of the victim, and the Eucharist contains only a *figure* of Christ's immolation.

16th cent.	Casal (in Consecration); Bellarmine (in Communion); Suarez, Estius, Vasquez (immutation in the sacramental species only).	Salmeron, Maldonatus (in Consecration); de Soto (in Communion).
17th cent.	Richelieu (in Consecration); Meldola (in Communion); Jean de Lugo (in Consecration and Communion together).	Cornelius à Lapide; Petavius; Olier; Bossuet; Thomassin.
18th cent.	Alphonso de Liguori, etc.	The French school generally finds the sacrifice "in the oblation of Christ present under the signs of His immolation."
19th cent. (up to 1870).	de Maistre; Faber.	(The sacrifice consists primarily in the oblation): Kenrick (U.S.A.); Möhler (Germany); Gosselin (France).
1870 onwards.	Franzelin, Gasparri.	(*a*) The sacrifice consists in the purely mystical immolation of Christ—Lebreton; Billot; d'Hulst; (*b*) in the sacred meal—Renz; (*c*) in the oblation—Batiffol; Bp. Macdonald; de la Taille.

Père de la Taille, in particular, finds the sacrifice in the oblation which the Church makes of Christ at the altar, through the Consecration which represents the immolation of Calvary.

M. Lepin proceeds to subject Père de la Taille's thesis to a detailed examination and criticism, summing it up under a series of propositions, on each of which he comments. In the ensuing summary, de la Taille's propositions are printed in inverted commas, and Lepin's criticisms follow each.

1. "Sacrifice consists essentially in *gift to God*, which is a visible sign of an interior and invisible disposition and intention." Agreed.

2. "Sacrifice consists of two parts, (*a*) oblation, (*b*) immolation." But some of the sacrifices of the Jewish law do not contain (*b*) at all, and immolation is not usually done by the priest.

3. "The oblation has to do with an immolation which is future, present, or past." But is there a single instance of a victim being ritually "given" to God *before* immolation? True, the placing of the priest's hands on the victim's head preceded the rite; but that was never a substitute for the oblation rites, but simply signified that the victim represented the priest.

4. "The donation-rite must be a real liturgical action." But that was not the case, for example, with the shewbread. Père de la Taille makes the oblation too much an *instantaneous* act, whereas it was a complex of rites which included the presentation of the victim at the entry

of the tabernacle, the imposition of the priest's hands on its head, and the immolation, as well as the subsequent rites.

5. "The oblation of the blood is the unique principal rite of sacrificial oblation." But the consumption of the fats, etc., on the altar is also a part of it, and, indeed, the more vital (Lev. vii. 29-31); and it is to this *combustion* that the signs of the divine favour are vouchsafed (Lev. ix. 24; Judg. ii. 19, 20; 2 Chron. vii. 1).

6. "The sacrifice of the Cross involves an act of ritual oblation, which was the Last Supper." But this need of ritual oblation applies only to *ritual sacrifice*—e.g., *the sacrifices of the Law*, whereas Christ the Priest offered Himself actually as Victim to the Father on the Cross, and needed no such additional rite. We should not interpret the reality by the figure, but *vice versa*; what Scripture means is that Christ *offered Himself* in real and true sacrifice. The New Testament shows Him always throughout His Life offering Himself to God, and most visibly and sensibly in His Passion; so that even de la Taille thinks of the oblation at the Supper *being continued* right up to the Cross. If so, the Supper is not the unique, essential, only proper sacerdotal and sacrificial, act of His oblation. *John* does not record the Supper; *Hebrews* identifies the oblation with the Cross (vii. 27, ix. 26, 28); neither suggests that the Supper was the act of oblation. So, too, the Fathers and St. Thomas. It was Christ's own willingness to die (not the Supper) which turned the Cross from a murder into a sacrifice.

7. "The oblation of the Supper is uniquely an oblation for the morrow's immolation." But the records of it do not suggest this. And in that case the command to repeat would mean that the disciples must offer Him or themselves, as an oblation, to death. The "real presence" was necessary at the Supper, only if Christ wished to offer something other than the sacrifice of the Cross—*i.e.*, a true sacrifice, identical so far as priest and victim were concerned, but different in the mode of oblation. The Supper is not an oblation which would dedicate the victim to the morrow's immolation, but the oblation of the victim actually and simply destined to immolation and made present under the species. We conclude, therefore, that the Supper inaugurates the *ritual* sacrifice of the Eucharist, which our Lord wishes to leave to his Church. Its relation to the Cross is that of symbol to thing signified, because the Eucharistic sacrifice, being the application of the redeeming sacrifice, must be relative to the Cross.

8. Furthermore, when de la Taille comes to consider the sacrifice in heaven, he is compelled to restrict this to the existence in heaven of Him who was *once* immolated and offered; he has no room for a present and active offering and sacrifice of the ascended Lord.

His arguments are (*a*) "sacrifice belongs to the genus *sign*—but there are no *signs* in heaven." But the heavenly worship described in *Revelation* is full of them; and the oblation in heaven is a *continuation* of that on earth. (*b*) "Christ's Resurrection corresponds to the victim's combustion on the altar, and His Ascension to the smoke mounting skywards." But then there is nothing in the Resurrection and Ascension corresponding to the oblation of the blood. Yet *Hebrews* definitely speaks of such oblation as involved in the Ascension; saying that Christ *offered Himself* once and for all, and is risen for ever, and yet attributing to Him at His entry into heaven another *offering*, solemn and liturgical—*i.e.*, that of His own blood, carried before God for universal purification and the sealing of the

eternal covenant. Indeed, by the "unique oblation" of Christ in *Hebrews*, we must understand the immolation *plus* the oblation of His blood in heaven.

Exteriorly, and in so far as Christ's oblation took the form of immolation, it cannot be repeated or continued; but He can and does still actively offer Himself in heaven with the same *interior* disposition as He had at the Cross; and this is a continuation and perpetuation of the great redemptive sacrifice. *Hebrews* shows our Lord performing before God the function of priest and liturgy, by a true act of oblation: an oblation wholly spiritual, but not less acceptable to the Father; yet also in a way "sensible," as the centre for the heavenly worship. Patristic thought emphasizes the heavenly oblation even more than the Eucharistic.

Some of M. Lepin's criticisms seem to me to be not of much weight. As regards (2), for instance, it can hardly be seriously disputed that the Eucharist is connected with an immolation; while as regards (3), it is to be observed that the Passover was, in fact, instituted *before* the event which it was to commemorate. Lepin's argument also seems to lose force, when we reflect that in the case of our Lord's sacrifice the Victim was divine, and therefore already acceptable; whereas in the Jewish sacrifices the victim was not acceptable until its death had cleansed it of all taint of the worshipper's sins.

At the same time, M. Lepin has, I think, found the weak point in de la Taille's argument, when he criticizes his use of the term "oblation"; though his own terminology is no less open to attack from a different quarter. The real issue, indeed, not only between these two writers, but in almost all discussion of the question, is one of terminology; and on this point Lepin does little more than keep the pendulum still swinging. In *Essays Catholic and Critical*, Mr. Spens used the phrase "sacerdotal acts" to express what de la Taille calls "oblation"; and he has since suggested to me that the word "consecration" would perhaps be better still. The term "oblation" is (somewhat unfortunately) identified in the English liturgy with the immolation on the Cross; while Roman theology tends to identify it with the verbal oblation in the Mass. "Oblation," however, is best reserved as an explanatory synonym for sacrifice in general, expressive of its meaning as an act of giving to God; and, so far as Lepin's thesis involves this, it is to be welcomed. But in that case we need two terms for the two parts of sacrifice which it is de la Taille's great service to have brought out in clear relief; and while "immolation" is the obvious term for our Lord's death on the Cross, "consecration" well represents that rite in which our Lord gave to His death its atoning significance (John xvii. 19), and willed that its meaning should be proclaimed and its benefits applied to the Church throughout the ages.

E. G. SELWYN.

REVIEWS

THE IDEAS OF THE FALL AND OF ORIGINAL SIN. A Historical and Critical Study. The Bampton Lectures for 1924. By Norman Powell Williams, D.D. Fellow and Chaplain of Exeter College, Oxford. Longmans, 1927. 21s. net.

As a study in historical theology, Dr. Williams's Bampton Lectures will rank high among the achievements of the first quarter of the twentieth century. His recent election to the Lady Margaret Professorship at Oxford, upon which we offer our warmest congratulations; is in large measure a well-deserved tribute to the brilliance of this book.

The first six lectures are given up to a survey of the various attempts in Judaism and Christianity to account for the "radical evil" inherent in human nature as we know it. They conclude with an examination and criticism of the fully developed Augustinian doctrine, which is still too often regarded as the official teaching of the Christian Church on the subject. The full value of these chapters can only be appreciated by a study of them. The treatment is full and lucid. There can be little doubt about the author's meaning. Above all, he is never dull. The skill with which he disentangles the various elements of the problem and shows the very scanty authority possessed by many popular beliefs, is worthy of the highest praise. He shows conclusively the entire lack of evidence for the view that primitive man ever enjoyed vast gifts of intellect or character. His argument that the idea of "original guilt" is unreasonable and immoral is unanswerable. His sympathy is with the teaching of the early Greek Fathers, who held that the first man was "an imperfect, undeveloped, and infantile creature" endowed with powers of self-consciousness and self-determination which constituted "a starting-point for progress and upward evolution," and that the first sin was easily pardonable, being that of a frail and ignorant creature, and appealing to God's pity rather than to His wrath. Even on his somewhat rigid principles of authority, he has no difficulty in showing that the full Augustinian doctrine has no claim to be called truly Catholic. There are points in his treatment where many will demur. His interpretation of St. Paul's psychology is at least open to dispute, and obscures the very close connection between ψυχή and σάρξ. Nor are we in the least convinced that St. Paul, like St. Augustine, looked back to a past stained by sins of the flesh. His own words in Phil. iii. 4-7, about having "confidence in the flesh" and being "found blameless," contradict this attempt to read St. Paul with the eyes of Freud. But these are minor

points. Dr. Williams has done a work of demolition that needed to be done with such thoroughness that it should not need to be done again.

We must at this point draw attention to the fact that this work, with its frank criticism balanced by due respect for authority, reflects in a special degree the strength of the Anglican Church. A shrewd judge has observed that such a book as *Essays Catholic and Critical* was calculated to emphasize the real point of division between ourselves and Rome far more than differences in matters of worship, or even Church order. The same applies even more forcibly to this book. No Roman Catholic priest would dare to express publicly the opinions here put forward. If we may trust certain recent Roman statements, the belief in an actual Adam and Eve and in the historical truth of the narratives of Genesis is regarded as essential, at least in public discussion. On the other hand, Protestantism tends to ignore the value of past attempts to formulate theological truth, and owing to its contempt for authority, misses the full contribution that the experience and learning of the past can make. Anglicanism at least provides an intellectual atmosphere where truth can be sought and modern discoveries faced and appraised in full loyalty to Catholic principles and devotion. A book such as this is the justification for much in the method of the Church of England that it is hard to defend on the lines of strict logic.

When we pass on to the constructive side of Dr. Williams's theology, in spite of much acute and pungent argument, we find ourselves in serious disagreement both with his psychology and his philosophy. In the seventh lecture he attempts to reinterpret the concept of "original sin" along the lines of the New Psychology. He explains it as a "weakness of will" or an "inherited infirmity of herd-instinct," "which is transmitted from parent to offspring through biological and not merely through social heredity." The argument is ingenious, but unduly simplifies the nature of moral obligation and tends to use psychological terms in a sense that is at least open to dispute. No one would wish to deny that in its earliest stages the moral sentiment is largely built up out of elements of instinct that can generally be described under the heading of herd-instinct. In other words, the content of morality coincides with tribal custom. But, as Dr. Williams himself states, there comes a time when the moral sense emancipates itself from the control of the herd-sentiment. Good is no longer what herd-custom ordains, but what the ethical self approves. It has become plain that morality is not merely the will of the herd. There arises the possibility of conflict between the moral judgment of the individual and

the tradition of the tribe. Moral advance often depends on the determination of the individual to be loyal to his best self as against the promptings of the community. How can the failure of the individual to do this be assigned to the infirmity of herd-instinct? Rather it is the excessive strength of the herd-sentiment that thwarts moral advance. If we consider the case of such a man as Jeremiah championing the cause of God and righteousness, it is plain that his teaching derived neither its authority nor its support from herd-instinct. Rather his opponents were the victims of herd-suggestion in its strongest form. Or, again, men have often to decide between allegiance to one of two conflicting herds, inspired by different moral ideals. The failure to decide aright cannot be due to mere infirmity of herd-instinct. In short, no one shows more eloquently than Dr. Williams that the sex-instinct is in itself morally neutral. Precisely the same is true of herd-instinct, as such. What is behind the moral failure of mankind is not weakness of instinct, but failure to sublimate it aright. It is true that up to a point herd-instinct lends a general support to morality, though incidentally it supports many customs that are evil; but unless we are to hold that right and wrong are merely the products of the social consciousness, it is not in the least true that herd-instinct necessarily prompts to right action, or that there is any tendency in it to seek the highest good of the largest whole, as he sometimes seems to suggest. While at certain stages the impulse to do right proceeds in the main from the social sentiment, society does not create the difference between right and wrong, nor is conscience a mere emotion. When once man has grasped, though he has taken a long time to grasp it, that something may be objectively valid or objectively good, even though not only himself but his group fail to accept and desire it, then the impulse to seek and realize it no longer proceeds from any mere elaboration of herd-instinct. Dr. Williams has also failed to make the distinction between the unorganized herd and the group. Mere mass-suggestion is on the whole a degrading force, but membership in a group makes possible a higher type of life. In the group herd-instinct itself has been moralized, and the failure to achieve this is one great cause of man's failure to advance.

But a still more serious criticism remains. Sin is a term of religion rather than of pure ethics. Religion has every claim to be regarded as an autonomous form of human activity. But in this chapter Dr. Williams minimizes the religious reference of sin. This attitude underlies his attempt to limit the term "sin" to what is ethically blameworthy. In Scripture sin always conveys the notion of what is displeasing to God. He is obliged

to make St. Paul say exactly the opposite of what he does in fact say (p. 133 note). St. Paul plainly distinguishes between sin that is imputed and sin that is not, and he expressly calls both sin. The reason is that both alike disqualify from full sympathy with God. Dr. Williams more than once uses the term "repent" in connection with original sin. Is not this open to the same objection? How can a man repent of being what he ought not to be, when he is in no way responsible for his condition? The Scripture use of the term "sin" at least dispenses us from the impossible task of trying to decide where actual sin ends and original sin begins, though it insists that both alike must be faced and a remedy sought, if the sinner is to enjoy that fellowship with God for which he was created. Here too Dr. Williams seems hardly to do justice to the truth that underlies the scholastic distinction between man's natural and supernatural endowments. No doubt it is mixed up with ideas that are historically and scientifically ridiculous, but it preserves the religious truth that man's nature can only develop aright in dependence upon God. Sin disorders man's nature because it impairs that fellowship with God which is the condition of health. The *privatio* inevitably issues in a *depravatio*. If the environment in response to which man is to live includes God, and God not merely as one among many objects but as the dominant Reality, then the inability to respond is no mere weakness of herd-instinct, and the consequences are not only moral but spiritual. It is significant that the supreme Christian sin is pride.

The last lecture deals with the problem of the ultimate origin of man's present condition. The treatment admirably succeeds in bringing out the complexity and obscurity of the problem—at least, for anyone who believes in a God of goodness and love. The author argues most convincingly for the need of some *à priori* reasoning. The present condition of the world cannot be explained without going outside the order of nature as we know it. The first sin, even if we could discover it, must be in some sense an effect and not only a cause. But once more we find ourselves unable to accept the suggested solution. He postulates a world-soul, a created being, personal and free, who "at the beginning of time, in some transcendent and incomprehensible manner, turned away from God," so that the whole life-force was vitiated at its source. We distrust Dr. Williams's philosophy. In Neo-Platonism the idea of the world-soul is at least intelligible; in any Christian philosophy he is a supernumerary. Throughout the book the author has constantly depreciated the influence of so-called "social heredity." He has failed to allow for the fact that, if the New Psychology is

right, man is born with instincts of the most general kind, so that even before birth the infant is shaped by its social environment. Social heredity should mean to us infinitely more than it could to Pelagius. And now this neglect of social heredity takes its revenge. It is hard to see in the world-soul of Dr. Williams's imagination more than the ghost of social heredity magnified by a mist, and called in as a *deus ex machina*.

But it is impossible to close a notice of a book of this learning and value with a note of criticism. The author has done a real work for the furtherance of the Gospel. He has swept away much that was an obstacle to a living faith. And his solutions have the great merit that they seek to preserve the right devotional values for religion.

E. J. BICKNELL.

NOTICES

THE YOUNG ENGLISHMAN: A STUDY. By Francis Underhill. Mowbray. 4s. 6d.

This is a book by one who is master of his subject. "We must study our boys," he writes, "and try and see them as they really are"; and it is clear that he has followed the advice he gives. We are all familiar with "studies" dashed off after a brief and superficial survey, and we know how to estimate their value. But here we have something of a different order. The author has had opportunities of studying the youth of England over a long period and under varying circumstances. He knows from the inside one of our greatest public schools and Oxford University; and he has been in frequent touch with public-school and university and professional men during many years of his ministry. But he has also mixed intimately with the less fortunate classes in a large industrial district, and he can speak with an uncommon authority about the conditions of life that help to mould the boy from our poorer homes. If the title leads us to fear mere generalizations, a glance at the book reassures us. The "Young Englishman" is not one but many, and he is studied in his many expressions and his varying conditions of life, in home and school and the wide world.

The reader will be struck by the writer's gift for vividly interesting descriptions; and if it is true that much of our class antagonism arises from our ignorance and misunderstanding of one another's conditions of life, these descriptive chapters will help us to knowledge and perhaps to a more understanding sympathy, and do much to remove prejudice.

The book is frankly critical of many of the conventions and institutions which help to mould the lives of our boys; and we do well to remember that they are not the criticisms of an armchair theorist, but of one who is qualified by experience to judge by the facts. All manner of problems of boy life are considered—the unsatisfactory home, educational methods, the morals of public schools, the ineffectiveness of church schools, the handicap of class distinctions, misapprehensions of modern psychology, the insistent demands of the sex instinct—but it is obvious that no really

full discussion of big questions is possible in one short book. The reader may constantly be disappointed at the necessarily brief treatment of big subjects; but he will find that he has been given facts to face, and that he has been stimulated to think. There is probably no easy solution to most of the problems on which the book touches; but parents, teachers, clergy, social reformers, and the more thoughtful young Englishman himself, all have their contribution to make towards finding solutions—and this book may well help them to do it. It should be read by all who care about the true development of our splendid English boys.

JOHN HOW.

THE ETERNAL SPIRIT. By C. E. Raven, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton. 2s. 6d.

An account of the Church Congress of October, 1926. The gist of a few outstanding statements will indicate the line of thought. The poverty of our doctrinal equipment in regard to the Spirit becomes increasingly obvious. The Church repudiates the suggestion of a conflict between nature and religion. Evangelicalism has tended to create the impression that the work of God is confined to the moral sphere. In the working theology of the ordinary Christian, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is incomplete. The centre of gravity in religion is shifting from authority to experience. Creation and Redemption come from the same source, and the reverent study of nature sets us free from the dualism which contrasts the indifference of the universe with the compassion of Jesus Christ. Textual criticism, exegesis, and the study of Christian origins must now yield first place to the synthetic interpretation of the universe. The Spirit empowers the whole range of Christian interests and activities, economic, social, moral, and æsthetic, as well as the technically "religious." The theoretic claim of economics to be free from religious and moral standards has led to practical disasters. Life has lost unity by its division into specialized departments, largely unrelated to each other and to any ultimate standard.

The first half of the Congress programme was devoted to theory, the second to the detailed application of faith in the Holy Spirit to the life of today. Four representative fields were chosen: physical welfare, the expression of beauty, mental development, and devotional service.

H. LOVELL CLARKE.

CATHOLIC EVANGELICALISM. A Study in the Life and Teaching of St. Paul. By J. G. Simpson, D.D. Faith Press. 3s. 6d.

A careful and original piece of work. Dr. Simpson's chief contention is that Christianity is essentially a certain definite experience of Christ. This is common to all real Christians, and the classical exponent of it is St. Paul. Thus the book comes to be a treatise on the mind of St. Paul. His gospel is the "word of the Cross," which includes the Resurrection. This gospel is "self-authenticating" and logically prior to any teaching about the Spirit, the Church, the sacraments, or even the Incarnation. The author seems to exaggerate the opposition between the ethical and the mystical, and this leads him to decry the historic and Catholic idea of the Eucharist as feeding on the Life of Jesus, and to deny that St. Paul ever

gave any such teaching. There is a very interesting chapter on St. Paul's view of sex and marriage, and another on theosophy, though in the latter it is surprising to find Dr. Simpson seeming to confuse confession with direction.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

FOUNDATIONS OF FAITH. IV. ESCHATOLOGICAL. By Rev. W. E. Orchard, D.D. George Allen and Unwin. 5s.

This is the concluding volume of Dr. Orchard's series of expositions of the Catholic faith, or, in other words, of the scholastic theology, for to the author the terms seem to be synonymous. The book is interesting, but it bears the marks of hasty writing. The literary style might be improved, and the attempt to harmonize the *consensus scholasticorum* with modern thought is sometimes unconvincing. Thus, Dr. Orchard's unwillingness to deny that the flames of hell are material involves him in complete obscurity. Again, is it really true that on the one hand it "can be said with full authority of the Catholic Church" that "no soul will ever be lost but for impenitence, conscious rebellion against God and the determined refusal of His grace"; while on the other, "the Catholic Church has condemned the opinion" that the good heathen may be admitted to Limbo? It surely takes some hardihood to maintain that it is a *Catholic doctrine* that they go to heaven, which seems to be the conclusion that the author intends us to draw. So, too, "faith" is defined as "intense moral desire." Is this really a possible meaning for the word? However, there is some excellent material in the book, and it succeeds in putting the scholastic speculations in a very favourable light.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

THE ANGLICAN VIA MEDIA. By C. S. Carter, D.D. Thynne and Jarvis. 2s. 6d.

This well-written little book is intended to show that the Reformed Church of England was never intended to be a *via media*. The Elizabethan divines were thorough Protestants. The changes of the 1552 Prayer-book made in 1559 were not intended to have a doctrinal significance. The 16th and 17th century Churchmen believed in Episcopacy *where it could be had*. So they discriminated between Dissenters at home and non-episcopal foreign Churches; but they were in complete accord with the doctrinal position of the latter. Bishop Knox in a preface suggests that Anglo-Catholic writers will ignore so damaging a book, which refutes the fiction, propagated, so he declares, by writers like Bishops Gibson and Frere, that the Elizabethan religious settlement was conducted on Tractarian lines. But does he not misunderstand the school he dislikes so much? The true *ethos* of the Elizabethan Settlement they find in Hooker. In God's Providence, they hold, the Prayerbook as it emerged from the Reformation struggles in 1662 was consistent with Catholicism. They do not acknowledge that the tenets of sixteenth-century divines in any way bind their conscience, and discussions regarding the intensity of the Reformers' Protestant convictions leave them cold. They would maintain that men who were obviously mistaken in regarding the Pope as Antichrist fell into other errors in their passionate reaction from mediæval abuses. That the Church of England has proved a *via media* in practice is too obvious to be disputed.

W. K. L. CLARKE.

"THE ORCHARD BOOKS," Nos. 11 and 13; extra vols. 4 and 5.*

Here you have the quintessence of fourteenth-century English mysticism, together with an early thirteenth-century manual of devotional life, more formal and allegorical than mystical. The General Editor, with the publishers, has been culling from the trees in that orchard, and here are fruits from three out of the four richest trees therein. The fourth, *The Cloud of Unknowing*, has been issued as No. 4 of the Series.

The earliest and least mystical work here is *Eden's Fourfold River*, a quaint conceit from the story of Eden in Genesis ii. The editor, a Carthusian monk of the only existing monastic Charterhouse in England, that of Parkminster, near Cowfold, in Sussex, has taken his matter from a portentous treatise "Of the Fourfold Discipline of the Cell" (Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, vol. 153). From it he has extracted what seems to him likely to form "a contribution to practical piety at this present time." His translation is free, but faithful to the Latin. His introduction shows him to be a generous and broad-minded man, and his extracts on reading of Holy Scripture, meditation, prayer, and work, are suited to the use of all Christian people.

It is good to have handy pocket editions of these three mystical classics of the fourteenth century. They could not be presented in more pleasant form, print, or manner, and every reader will add his unofficial *nihil obstat* to their publication. Writing on the day dedicated in our Calendar to the "Name of Jesus," it is natural to observe that that name is the heart's core of these three books and of their writers. In the well-known picture of Rolle the hermit, from a fifteenth-century illuminated MS., the letters "IHS" are rubricated over his heart. He writes in this book, "Jesus Christ shall be the beginning of our love, whom we shall love for himself; and shall be the end of our love, for other things that we love shall be beloved for him." And this is the theme of all his writings, whether in prose, in verse, or in that curious blend of the two which was a feature of his style. These instructions in the devotional life had an immense vogue in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They were "Englished" from the Latin by five different translators, and at least eleven MSS. of that period survive, while in our present century this is the fourth such version to be issued in modern English. The present edition is charming for reading purposes, but is not quite fair either to Rolle, whose original Latin "A.P." does not seem to have consulted, or to Misyn, whose Middle English he seems frequently to misunderstand. However, all Rolle's teaching is practically here.

Walter Hilton, Augustinian Canon of Thurgarton, writes in his treatise with much the same purpose, to instruct one who wished to be led on towards "perfection." Here is the pith of his teaching: "Because thy ghostly eye is not yet opened, I shall tell thee one word for all, . . . for in that one word is all that thou hast lost. This word is Jesus" (p. 87). The editor has done his work well, and gives a very full epitome of the book in his introduction.

Lady Julian of Norwich is perhaps the most attractive of all these

* THE ORCHARD BOOKS.—No. 4 ex. *Eden's Fourfold River*, *circa* A.D. 1200—No. 5 ex. *The Amending of Life*. By Richard Rolle, of Hampole, Hermit [died 1349].—No. 13. *The Scale of Perfection*. By Walter Hilton, Augustinian Canon (died 1396).—No. 11. *Revelations of Divine Love* [*circa* 1373 to 1393]. By Julian of Norwich. (Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. Publishers to the Holy See. First series, 5s.; extra series, 2s. 6d.)

writers, but it is curious that so few MSS. of her revelations have come down to our times; only one before the time of printing, viz., the Amherst MS. of about 1413, and one each from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Dom Roger Hudleston, the general editor of the Orchard Books, supplies an excellent introduction. His text only varies in very slight degree from Miss Warrack's rendering of the Sloane MS. 2499, and the Glossary is practically reproduced verbatim from hers. The result is a very readable and handy edition, which should reach a wide public. It gives the longer text of the revelations, which it seems now to be accepted is the later or second edition. Here is her central message, as she looked at the Cross from her bed of intense suffering; "Thus was I learned to choose Jesus to my Heaven, whom I saw only in pain at that time: meliked no other Heaven than Jesus, which shall be my bliss when I come there" (p. 52).

Here then is the essence of the Christian Mysticism of the English Church of the Middle Ages, to be translated by us into the living vernacular of the Practical Mysticism of English church people today.

DUNDAS HARFORD.

FESTGABE FÜR ADOLPH DEISSMANN. Mohr: Tübingen. M. 18.

This volume of essays, presented to Professor Deissmann on his sixtieth birthday, November 7, 1926, contains many important articles in which exhaustive philological study illustrates the New Testament. The most important are: W. Michaelis' "Justification by Faith in Paul," which corroborates Deissmann's conclusion that Faith for the Apostle is not the preliminary condition of Justification, but its result; it is a gift of God, and practically equals communion with Christ. Otto Schmitz' "The Conception *δύναμις* in Paul"—*δύναμις* is a paradox, both a present possession of the believer and the object of hope for the future, a gift (*Gabe*) of God and a task (*Aufgabe*) of man. Dibelius' study of John xv. 13, "greater love hath no man . . .," which is declared to be a saying differing in spirit from the rest of the Gospel and incorporated as a *Fremdkörper*.

G. Bertram writes on the Ascension of Jesus from the Cross, presupposed in the Fourth Gospel, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and even in St. Paul—1 Cor. xv. is not typical of the Apostle's views! K. L. Schmidt's article on "The Church of Primitive Christianity" has already been reviewed (see THEOLOGY, September, 1927). Lohmeyer studies the formula *σὺν Χριστῷ* at great length. "With Christ" is pre-eminently a sacramental idea. Whereas in Hellenistic mysticism the adept becomes one with the cult-god, in Christian Baptism Christ is present, and the believer, remaining *other*, experiences association with Christ.

It is all rather bewildering to a cautious Anglican. Schmidt emphasizes, with Holl and Kattenbusch, the hierarchical character of the primitive Church. Bertram sees the Friday fast in Mark ii. 20—"then shall they fast in that day." Lohmeyer interprets Apoc. iii. 20—"behold, I stand at the door and knock" of a feast held by the individual soul with its Lord and Friend, looking back to the historic presence of Christ on earth and forward to His coming again, and based on the Eucharist. Perhaps the reaction of German theology towards Catholic interpretations of the New Testament is proceeding too quickly to be healthy, but one is bound to ask what is to be the practical effect of this change of wind in the Church life of Continental Protestantism.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

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